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TRADITIONAL VERSUS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS:  
EVIDENCE FROM CARDOZO AND POSNER TORTS OPINIONS 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
Abstract 
 
 This Article contributes a new approach and evidence to the 
longstanding debate concerning the relative merits of traditional legal 
analysis compared to contemporary economic analysis of law. It evaluates 
prominent opinions of two judicial exemplars of the contending 
conceptions, the traditionalist Benjamin Cardozo and the economist 
Richard Posner, in torts, the field where economic analysis has greatest 
impact. Comparative critique of their opinions appearing in current torts 
casebooks, where they are the most ubiquitous judges, provides evidence 
that traditional legal analysis is a more capacious and persuasive basis of 
justification than contemporary economic analysis of law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article contributes to the debate on traditional versus economic 
analysis in law,1 presenting evidence from torts opinions of Benjamin 
Cardozo and Richard Posner. Proponents of economic analysis offer to 
show law’s efficiency as a descriptive matter and prescribe using it,2 
especially in tort law,3 the field of its greatest impact.4 Skeptics question 
the method’s descriptive accuracy and normative appeal, compared to 
traditional legal analysis,5 which has made similarly influential 
contributions to tort law.6 While other scholars use theoretical, 
philosophical, and doctrinal techniques to investigate,7 this Article 
 7. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 3 (using largely philosophical); LANDES & POSNER, 
 1. The referenced debate can be delineated in narrower terms than traditional versus 
economic analysis. See generally,  LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 
(2002) (using the terms fairness versus welfare); Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and 
Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303, 311–16 (2005) (noting many ways economic analysis can be 
described); Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA. L. REV. 899 (2009) 
(using the terms normative versus utilitarian); Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 
YALE L.J. 1511, 1514, 1522 (2003) (reviewing KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra) (using the terms 
deontology versus efficiency). 
 2. E.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 324 (5th ed. 2008); 
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1; Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law 
and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 85, 92 (2005). 
 3. E.g., DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW 
(1992); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 39 (1970); 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 312–13 
(1987); John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 323 
(1973); R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1960); Keith N. Hylton, 
Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501, 1501–02 (2006). 
 4. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 192–93 (2004).  
Within tort law, the referenced debate denominated as traditional versus economic analysis assumes 
yet other descriptions. E.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both 
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (using the terms efficient 
deterrence versus corrective justice). 
 5. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 234–51, 374–82 (1992); ANTHONY T. 
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 237–38 (1993); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 148, 
159–64, 195 (1995). 
 6. E.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 10–25 (2001); Shawn J. Bayern, 
The Limits of Formal Economics in Tort Law: The Puzzle of Negligence, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010); Izhak Englard, Law and Economics in American Tort Cases: A Critical 
Assessment of the Theory’s Impact on Courts, 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 359, 359 (1991); Mark Geistfeld, 
Efficiency, Fairness and the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, in THEORETICAL  FOUNDATIONS OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 234, 234–36 (Mark D. White ed., 2009); Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence, 
87 GEO. L.J. 397, 397 (1998); Michael D. Green, Negligence=Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1605– 06 (1997); John C. Moorhouse et al., Law & Economics and Tort Law: A 
Survey of Scholarly Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 667–68 (1998); Ronen Perry, Re-torts, 59 ALA. 
L. REV. 987, 988 (2008); Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula,” 
4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 145, 146–53 (2003); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law: Sleight of 
Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2001–02 (2007). 
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considers how the methods fare in opinions of judicial exemplars of the 
contending conceptions: Cardozo, quintessential traditionalist,8 and 
Posner, avatar economist.9 Comparative evaluation of those opinions, the 
most ubiquitous in torts casebooks,10 provides evidence that traditional 
legal analysis is a more capacious basis of justification than contemporary 
economic analysis of law and that this feature, though suffering from some 
indeterminacy, yields more persuasive justification in a wider range of 
cases.  
Cardozo’s distinctiveness is a grand rhetorical style exemplifying 
traditional method.11 During a twenty-four-year career, he displayed 
pragmatic sensibilities blending intuitions of substantive justice with thick 
doctrine incorporating economic, moral and social factors.12 In Isaiah 
Berlin’s terms, Cardozo was a fox who knew many things.13 Cardozo 
frequently shifted among doctrines, rendering complex opinions that 
demonstrate the capacity, power, and limits of traditional legal analysis.  
In contrast, Posner’s distinction is economic analysis, a contemporary 
mode of justification he popularized as a scholar14 and judge.15 With 
E NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921); 
LAW (7th ed. 2007) (Judge 
ELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 157–58 (1951). 
 REV. 1, 17–18 (1938); 
alism About Nominalism, 60 
ls & Nicholas Mercuro, Posnerian Law and Economics on the 
Bench, 4 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 108 (1984); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just so Stories: Posnerian 
supra note 3 (using largely doctrinal); Bayern, supra note 6 (using largely theoretical); Coase, 
supra note 3 (using largely theoretical); Coleman, supra note 1 (using largely philosophical); 
Wright, supra note 6 (using largely doctrinal). 
 8. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, TH
ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 199–222 (1998); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN 
REPUTATION 20–57 (1990); Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 
COLUM. L. REV. 20, 20 (1939). Cardozo was a New York Court of Appeals judge for eighteen years 
(1914–1932) (the first three by designation from a lower court) and Supreme Court Justice for six 
(1932–1938, before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). 
 9. See generally, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
Posner’s law and economics casebook); Commentaries, Twenty-Five Years of Richard Posner, the 
Judge, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (2007) (symposium with more than a dozen articles, each 
dissecting one famous Posner opinion); Special Issue, Commemorating Twenty-Five Years of Judge 
Richard A. Posner, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641 (2007) (same). Since 1982, Posner has been a judge on 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
 10. See infra note 34. 
 11. See KARL N. LLEW
 12. See, e.g., Walton Hamilton, Cardozo the Craftsman, 6 U. CHI. L.
William E. Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in New York, 
1920–1980, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 117, 126 (1999); Edwin W. Patterson, Cardozo’s Philosophy of Law, 
88 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 72 (1939); John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 
1421 (1999) (reviewing KAUFMAN, supra note 8); Joshua P. Davis, Note, Cardozo’s Judicial Craft 
and What Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 777, 794–99 (1993). 
 13. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX 1–2 (1953). 
 14. E.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Re
VA. L. REV. 451, 452 (1974); Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory 
of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1040 (1978); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a 
Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer’s Guide to Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. 
L. REV. 1655, 1656–57 (1974). 
 15. E.g., Warren J. Samue
2010] TRADITIONAL VERSUS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5 
 
                                                                                                                     
economic analysis being the predominant  characteristic of Posner 
opinions, he may be classified, in Berlin’s terms, as a hedgehog, who 
knows one big thing. Of course, during his twenty-seven-year career, 
Posner has also shown traditional skills of a legal craftsman and shrewd 
rhetorician.16 But Posner’s opinions typically take a linear approach, 
following the orderly logic of contemporary economic analysis. 
Cardozo’s torts opinions used traditional legal concepts, like 
reasonableness, foreseeability, and duty. These perform admirably, if 
imperfectly, to analyze, classify and explain, though lacking formal 
economic theory. Posner’s tort opinions reference the same legal concepts 
but displace, adjust, or rationalize them, using modern economic concepts, 
like cost-benefit matrices, incentive effects, and least-cost avoidance 
models. This approach sometimes enriches, but often impoverishes, 
analysis, classification, and explanation. These contrasts appear in their 
opinions confronting a range of tort law problems, from basic issues in 
negligence to intermediate concerns of liability to advanced challenges 
about when third parties can enforce duties against contracting parties. 
Part II, on negligence, explains how Cardozo’s practical reasoning led 
him to empower juries to review conduct under an open-textured standard 
hinging on reasonable care.17 Cardozo employed a standard of everyday 
experience—custom and natural behavior. In contrast, Posner brings to 
negligence analysis a rigid economic formula, resembling a rule not a 
standard.18 Thin compared to traditional legal analysis, it balances formal 
categories of costs and benefits whose abstractness can disregard factors 
traditional legal analysis stresses.19 The limited capacity of Posner’s 
approach appears in how his approach is inapposite to many issues in 
negligence cases.20 True, Cardozo offered economic insights, but they 
. REV. 507, 507 (2009). 
gligence of driver crossing railroad tracks); infra text 
 of the Hand formula to compare negligence of guest versus motel, 
tim
Hand formula in case of guest suing hotel for 
on of the Hand formula to rail car inspector’s negligence claims 
against railroad and employer despite imperfect fit between that formula and the facts); infra text 
Methodology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 351, 351 (2001); George M. Cohen, Comment, Posnerian 
Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View from the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 
1117 (1985). 
 16. See Kate O’Neill, Rhetoric Counts: What We Should Teach When We Teach Posner, 39 
SETON HALL L
 17. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (Cardozo, J.) (articulating jury 
reasonableness standard to assess ne
accompanying notes 35–64. 
 18. See Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 855–56 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (applying 
Illinois law and using version
es ating cost of guest’s greater vigilance while overlooking cost to motel of installing phones in 
rooms); infra text accompanying notes 65–103. 
 19. See McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557–58 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) 
(applying Illinois law and using version of the 
negligence, estimating costs of locks and notices but overlooking hotel’s safety record); infra text 
accompanying notes 147–153. 
 20. See Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1263–64 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) 
(applying Illinois law and versi
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anemic, as it can reinforce traditional legal principles such as American 
never overwhelmed analysis,21 and moral intuitions enhanced his 
opinions.22 
Part II’s negligence cases illustrate how doctrinal capaciousness is not 
inevitably virtuous. Its value arises from capacity to incorporate endless 
factors in a flexible way. But this comes at the cost of opacity and 
indeterminacy. In negligence, the traditional doctrinal formulation, 
“reasonable care under the circumstances” is vague and offers at best a 
weak constraint on jury discretion. Trouble lurks in so capacious a 
doctrine.23 Contemporary economic analysis presents the opposite trade-
off.  It offers a formula exuding clarity and predictability, even a 
functional constraint on juries. Yet this virtue comes at the price of 
omitting relevant factors. Of course, it is difficult to say which is more 
important: flexibility or predictability. The ultimate test is whether 
applications in particular cases are more or less persuasive, and the side-
by-side study of Cardozo and Posner opinions gives Cardozo the edge. 
Part III, engaging liability, shows that Cardozo’s rhetoric fortified legal 
analysis while Posner’s economics antagonizes it and how Cardozo’s 
framework accommodated contending values while Posner’s exalts 
economic efficiency.24 In cases concerning an attenuated relation between 
action and injury, it is hard to improve on Cardozo’s traditional legal 
analysis,25 and Posner’s opinions that follow that analysis are stronger than 
those extensively supplemented by contemporary economic analysis.26 
Traditional legal analysis has an unrivaled capacity to adapt to changing 
socioeconomic conditions.27 This is not to say economic analysis is 
                                                                                                                     
accompanying notes 154–73.  
 21. See Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.) (evaluating electrocuted 
boy’s allegations of negligence against electric railway using basic economic insights); infra text 
railway given reasonableness of actions); infra text accompanying 
utory violation negligence per se as matter of legal duty juries cannot waive), with 
nger); infra text accompanying 
nsin law and using traditional legal analysis to limit employer liability to 
anufacturer at dawn of mass 
production and consumerism); infra text accompanying notes 229–39. 
accompanying notes 104–25. 
 22. See Wagner v. Int’l R.R., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.) (upholding jury 
verdict in case of rescuer suing 
notes 126–146. 
 23. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble With Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1188–
89 (2001). 
 24. Compare Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J.) (holding 
driver’s stat
Davis, 788 F.2d at 1262, 1264–65 (Posner, J.) (treating inspector’s regulatory violation as factor in 
negligence formula). See infra text accompanying notes 174–93. 
 25. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) (applying 
duty and foreseeability test to limit railway liability to remote passe
notes 194–215.  
 26. See Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1223–24 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) 
(applying Wisco
hypochondriac employee); infra text accompanying notes 216–228. 
 27. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053–55 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.) 
(rejecting privity defense to retail car buyer’s negligence suit against m
2010] TRADITIONAL VERSUS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7 
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 torts opinions of these 
exe
justification than contemporary economic analysis. This Article’s 
conclusion explains this evidence in terms of how traditional legal analysis 
tort law’s preference for liability based on fault rather than strict liability.28 
But, as Part IV illustrates, traditional legal analysis is indispensible, and 
temporary economic analysis cannot supplant it. Venerable legal 
principles like duty facilitate navigating challenges such as when third 
parties may enforce tort or contract rights against contracting parties.29 
Economic explanations of law, like least-cost avoidance models, support 
legal judgments30 but cannot resolve disputes without the tools traditional 
legal analysis provides.31 Cardozo’s opinions supply guidance for 
navigation;32 Posner’s opinions offer economic accounts that can be 
persuasive, though less parsimonious, and only persuasive because they 
explain results traditional legal analysis yields.33  
Accordingly, comparative evaluation of leading
mplary judges, both noted for tort law expertise,34 provides evidence 
that traditional legal analysis is a more capacious and persuasive basis of 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Amer. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1180–82 (7th Cir. 
 Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, 
See Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (applying 
441, 447 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, C.J.) (denying 
rd, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (N.Y. 1922) (Cardozo, J.) (finding breach of 
43 (stating that Cardozo’s “most famous opinions were 
in t
1990) (Posner, J.) (applying Indiana law and using economic analysis to justify applying 
negligence, not strict liability, to switching line’s claim against chemical manufacturer); infra text 
accompanying notes 240–255. 
 29. See H.R. Moch Co. v.
C.J.) (finding no duty in citizen’s suit against city’s water supplier); infra text accompanying notes 
256–77. 
 30. 
Indiana law and finding no duty in negligence claim by fireman’s widow against fire alarm 
service); infra text accompanying notes 278–290. 
 31. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 
lender’s negligent misrepresentation claim against borrower’s accountants); infra text 
accompanying notes 291–304. 
 32. See Glanzer v. Shephe
duty by seller’s expert certifying product weight to buyer); infra text accompanying notes 305–17. 
 33. See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) (applying 
Illinois law and finding breach of duty by borrower’s lawyer  who opined on security to lender); 
infra text accompanying notes 317–332. 
 34. See KAUFMAN, supra note 8, at 2
he field of torts”); KAUFMAN, supra note 8, at 250 (referring to Cardozo’s “fame as a torts 
innovator”); Andrew L. Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo as Paradigmatic Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 281, 281–82 (1999). See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3 (analyzing tort law 
from an economic perspective). Cardozo and Posner opinions are the most ubiquitous in current 
torts casebooks. On average, casebooks reprint more Cardozo torts opinions than any other judge’s; 
Posner is second. Cardozo has an aggregate of ten opinions reproduced in the twenty-one current 
torts casebooks, of which six appear in more than one-fourth of them and one in all books. Posner 
has an aggregate of twenty-six opinions reproduced in the twenty-one casebooks, of which twenty-
one appear in only one or two books and only one appears in more than one-fourth of them. This 
Article analyzes all but one of those ten Cardozo opinions. And of Posner’s twenty-six opinions so 
appearing, those analyzed were chosen as substantive matches with Cardozo’s to facilitate 
comparative evaluation. Review of their other reprinted opinions supports this Article’s thesis. 
Compilations of the foregoing data are available on request. 
8 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
 and Posner weave when 
addressing basic problems in ordinary
legal analysis used expressions of reasonableness and expectations, and 
inv
 influence on torts jurisprudence is epitomized by Pokora v. 
Wabash Railway,35 an o ontributory negligence 
outlining the relation be  establishing the appeal 
of 
 sure whether a train is dangerously near, they must stop, 
get
promotes comprehending complex human reality that contemporary 
economic analysis oversimplifies. It also notes the declining utility of 
contemporary economic analysis in tort law and gradual absorption of its 
more useful parts into traditional legal analysis. 
II.  NEGLIGENCE 
This Part identifies contrasting motifs Cardozo
 negligence. Cardozo’s traditional 
oked social norms, moral impulses, economic insights, and other 
intuitions of substantive justice. Posner’s contemporary economic analysis 
rivets on economic points to speak of negligence in terms of a cost-benefit 
formula, seeking to overcome what Posner perceives as Cardozo’s 
moralizing tendency and propensity to substitute words for thought. But 
Cardozo’s traditionalism withstands Posner’s scrutiny, attested by how 
Cardozo’s approaches enjoy wide following while Posner’s are 
iconoclastic. 
A.  Juries and Standards 
Cardozo’s
pinion on negligence and c
tween judges and juries and
standards over rules. A truck driver approaching a railroad crossing 
could not see the track line, blocked by box cars on the switch; he stopped 
in his truck to listen for a bell or whistle signaling an approaching train, 
but heard nothing. When the truck driver reached the track, a train hit him 
going twenty-five to thirty miles per hour. The issue was the railroad’s 
defense of contributory negligence, which would bar recovery.36 Lower 
court judgments that the victim committed contributory negligence relied 
on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ opinion in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
v. Goodman.37  
Holmes announced that the care required of motorists approaching rail 
crossings was clear and better handled by judges than juries. He said when 
drivers cannot be
 out of their vehicle and look.38 Cardozo called Goodman “correct in its 
result.”39 The driver in that case could have seen the approaching train and 
                                                                                                                     
 35. 292 U.S. 98 (1934). Pokora predates Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
nal was negligence per se, as a state 
in v. 
 36. Id. at 99. Not in dispute, the railroad’s failure to sig
statute required trains approaching crossings to signal. Id. at 101 n.1. See generally, Mart
Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (1920) (treating statutory violations as negligence per se); infra text 
accompanying notes 174–84 (discussing Martin). 
 37. Pokora, 292 U.S. at 99 (citing Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927)). 
 38. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70. 
 39. Pokora, 292 U.S. at 102. 
2010] TRADITIONAL VERSUS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9 
 
“ev
ar in Pokora. One concerns the role of judges and 
jur
nse when embracing 
the flexibility of contextualized standards over rigid rules. Cardozo urged 
                                                                        
prevented the accident so failing to do so was negligent, which Cardozo 
said was “decisive of the case.”40 Cardozo treated as dicta talk in 
Goodman suggesting that drivers, unsure based on sight alone whether a 
train is approaching, always must stop and get out of their vehicles and 
look. True, the Pokora driver had a duty to get out and look, if doing so 
would help avoid the accident. But that did not mean inability to see made 
proceeding any more negligent than if amid night’s darkness he relied on 
listening.  
The precaution of getting out and looking is uncommon, according to 
eryday experience,” Cardozo said.41 He gave a series of hypothetical 
scenarios to show how Holmes’ formulation “is very likely to be futile, 
and sometimes even dangerous.”42 For example, a driver could get out, 
look, and return to the car; yet a train, not visible during inspection, could 
then draw dangerously near.43 Laws not based on experience are suspect as 
“not the natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules 
artificially developed, and imposed from without,” Cardozo wrote.44 
Absent customs and ordinary circumstances, what people must or should 
do in extraordinary circumstances, like those in Pokora, are “for the 
judgment of a jury.”45 
Several motifs appe
ies in negligence cases. In Goodman, Holmes said the care required in 
railway crossings is so clear that reasonable people would not differ about 
whether a breach occurred.46 Cardozo took the opposite stance, saying 
“what is suitable for the traveler caught in a mesh . . . is for the judgment 
of a jury.”47 This challenge to Holmes reflects Cardozo’s focus on roles, 
knowledge, and intentions of individuals whose conduct law governs. For 
Cardozo, people’s reasonable expectations should shape law, not the other 
way around, as Holmes advocated.48 Those reasonable expectations are 
heterogeneous, informed by a complex of norms, ethics, morals, utilities, 
and other factors that best registered using juries.49 
Second, Pokora embodies Cardozo’s practical se
                                             
t 104. 
 104–05. 
 Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927).  
 OF TORTS § 5 cmt. d (Discussion Draft 1999); Catharine Wells 
isunderstood Role in Negligence 
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 651–52 (2003). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. a
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at
 44. Id. at 105. 
 45. Id. at 106. 
 46. Baltimore &
 47. Pokora, 292 U.S. at 106. 
 48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 572–75 (1988). 
 49. See Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s out: Social Norms’ M
10 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
dev
the rule it 
ann
se predating 
Go
y and 
predictability than standards.58 The trouble with Holmes’ solution is it may 
elopment of law according to observations of behavior in customary 
forms, not according to an artificial formula. Cardozo’s doctrinal chiding 
of Holmes reflects the multi-dimensional pragmatism Cardozo expressed 
in The Nature of the Judicial Process: “logic, and history, and custom, and 
utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces which 
singly or in combination shape the progress of the law.”50 The result is a 
flexible jurisprudence, though Cardozo was not dogmatically flexible, 
justifying clear results in certain cases, including statutory violations51 and 
contexts when action and injury are not closely connected.52 
Third, though the opinion appeared incremental, it markedly changed 
prevailing law. Cardozo distinguished Goodman by saying 
ounced was dicta and thus, it must be limited to its facts.  This, 
however, was less an overruling than discussion showing continuity.53 Still 
it profoundly altered the course of jurisprudence in negligence cases by 
offering a convincing general rationale for favoring juries and standards 
over judges and rules to resolve them. Cardozo’s more flexible approach to 
negligence has since been preferred over Holmes’ rigid one.54 This motif 
of incremental change, leading other courts to follow new paths, attests to 
the persuasiveness of Cardozo’s traditional legal analysis.  
Holmes long favored limiting flexible jury negligence determinations 
with legal rules,55 and did so in a Massachusetts ca
odman.56  Justifications include concern about inconsistent results 
juries may produce that would impair treating similar cases alike.57 But 
judges exert control to change results by judgments notwithstanding the 
verdict or to preempt inconsistent results by directed verdicts. Moreover, 
inconsistent results can arise when judges decide negligence issues too. So 
putting power in judges does not eliminate the problem of inconsistency.  
A related concern is how inconsistent results may be more likely when 
applying standards rather than rules. Rules promote more consistenc
                                                                                                                     
 50. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 112. 
infra text accompanying 
lsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.); infra text 
E LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 310 (2000); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 
168
TH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 87–88 (3d ed. 2007); 
., THE COMMON LAW 123–24 (41st  prtg. 1948); O. W. 
o v. Wirth, 49 N.E. 1010, 1011 (Mass. 1898) (Holmes, J.).  
swell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with 
 51. See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920) (Cardozo, J.); 
notes 174–193. 
 52. See Pa
accompanying notes 194–215.  
 53. See DAN B. DOBBS, TH
–69 (1999). 
 54. KENNE
JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & M. STUART MADDEN, UNDERSTANDING TORTS 69 (3d ed. 
2007); EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 168–69. 
 55. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR
Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652 (1873), reprinted in 44 HARV. L. REV. 
773,776 (1931). 
 56. Lorenz
 57. ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 87. 
 58. See John E. Calfee & Richard Cra
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ove
t.  Still, 
giv
of negligence 
force appellate judges l renches, reviewing jury 
verdicts on negligence. I ner encounters Holmes’ 
Go
rlook context and how fact situations do not recur sufficiently similarly 
to be governed by a rule.59 Cardozo’s conclusion, usually followed by 
other courts, can be summed up: “reasonable people could consider the 
factual variations . . . to be sufficiently important to permit juries to decide 
them differently.”60 As a result, there has been no tendency to define 
negligence in rule-like terms and law gives juries discretion.61  
These grounds favoring Cardozo’s approach do not mean he or his 
followers show great trust in juries. Juries and standards may simply be 
better than judges and rules for reasons independent of jury trus 62
en credible reasons to support Holmes’ view, Cardozo’s approach 
suggests he had some degree of trust in juries, tempered with tools of 
judicial review.63 If so, Cardozo may have begun to buck the previous 
century’s trend of heightened mistrust of juries, manifested in the rise of 
contributory negligence that he neutralizes in Pokora.  64   
B.  Judges and Rules 
Pokora and its progeny that avoid providing clear rules 
ike Posner into the t
n some opinions, Pos
odman and Cardozo’s Pokora opinions. Posner sides with and echoes 
Cardozo by describing the “fallacy” in Holmes’ stop-and-get-out rule that 
it can “be worse than useless” since by the time a driver returns to her car 
to cross, “a train may be bearing down.”65 But Posner does not welcome 
the resulting standard of reasonableness and its unruly quality, calling 
applicable state law “authoritative, but not clear.”66 Instead, in numerous 
cases, Posner developed a more rigid, rule-like, approach to negligence, 
based on the Hand formula.  
Judge Learned Hand’s initial formulation announced: “The degree of 
care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: 
the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the 
ser
     
iousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest 
                                                                                                                
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 968 (1984). 
 59. ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 88. 
 60. See ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 88. 
 61. ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 87–88; DOBBS, supra note 53, § 132, at 310; EPSTEIN, supra 
note 53, at 168–69. 
 62. Statutory schemes like worker’s compensation may be better than either, and cheaper. 
 63. See KAUFMAN, supra note 8, at 253 (noting Cardozo’s proclivity to affirm jury verdicts). 
 64. See infra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing Martin v. Herzog and Cardozo’s 
engagement with contributory negligence). 
 65. Compare Justice v. CSX Transp. Inc., 908 F.2d 119, 123 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.), with 
Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934) (echoing Cardozo’s precise illustration).  
 66. Trevino v. Union Pac. R.R., 916 F.2d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (applying 
Illinois law). 
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 utility maximization at the expense of 
oth
as 
which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.”67 Hand refined the formula by 
designating likelihood of injury as probability, seriousness of injury as loss 
and the interest sacrificed burden.68 The test asks whether the burden of 
precaution is worth taking compared to the probability times loss: B < PL. 
Hand did not intend to elaborate a formal or rigid economic model but an 
intuitive tool to be used flexibly.69 
The Hand formula suggests analytical rigor. But it and kindred risk-
utility models have limits that do not plague traditional legal analysis. 
They concentrate on social wealth or
er values tort law may advance.70 These models risk denying individual 
justice in particular cases and failing to appreciate the value of equal 
freedom implicit in tort law’s role in promoting corrective justice.71 There 
can be doubt about how close a fit exists between the Hand formula’s three 
variables and incentives that influence behavior.72 Variables often cannot 
be quantified73 or are incommensurate.74 Evidence on cost of prevention 
(burden) may be elusive yet gets a pivotal place.75 And focus on the 
formula can prevent evaluating factors traditional legal analysis stresses.76 
The Hand formula’s effectiveness in appellate review may therefore be 
limited.77 Effectiveness depends on how rigorously it is conceived and 
applied. There is much debate about whether it should be used definitively 
an economic test or loosely as a practical reference.78 Posner favors a 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand. J), rev’d on other grounds, 
312 U.S. 492 (1941). 
 68. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.). 
admit of even approximate ascertainment”); see also Wright, supra note 6, 
 15 ver 
avid Owen ed., 1995). 
tion for Jury 
Adj
he Learned Hand Formula: A Hand That 
111 (1990). 
panying notes 66–75; infra text 
easonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. 
 69. Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.) (stating that formula 
variables often do not “
at 4–55 (noting that Hand mentioned the test in only eleven opinions from 1938 to 1949, ne
actually applied it, and in his last reference, abandoned it).  
 70. Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 336 & n.84 (1996); Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249, 250–51 (D
 71. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 573 
(1972); Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 37, 52–53 
(1983); Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justifica
udication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2350–51 (1990). 
 72. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 146, at 344–47. 
 73. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 60–65. 
 74. Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and t
Helps or a Hand That Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 77, 
 75. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 162, at 393. 
 76. For a discussion of Posner’s opinions in Wassell v. Adams, McCarty v. Pheasant Run, 
Inc., and Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corp., see supra text accom
accompanying notes 77–103 and 147–72. 
 77. See ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 66 (4th ed. 1995). 
 78. See, e.g., DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 64; Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining 
Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the R
REV. 813, 819–20 (2001). 
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 small town stayed at a 
che
explains that a rational jury could have apportioned fault 
as 
victim could have avoided it at a cost of $1; and the injurer could have 
avoided it at a cost of $2.85 The victim bears a 2:1 comparative fault ratio 
rigid version, attributing economic meaning to Hand’s original 
formulations, in pre-appointment scholarship79 and judicial opinions.80 Yet 
many applications of the Hand formula are strained, a weakness compared 
to traditional legal analysis.81 A leading example of this weakness and 
other problematic features is Wassell v. Adams.82 
In Wassell, a twenty-one-year old woman from a
ap motel in a high crime area of Chicago while visiting her fiancé. At 1 
a.m., there was a knock on the door; the guest, thinking it was her fiancé, 
checked the peephole, saw no one, and opened the door. A stranger 
entered, attacked, and repeatedly raped the guest. There was no phone in 
the room and no security guard on the premises. The guest sought damages 
for post-trauma stress, alleging negligent failure to warn of danger or 
protect her from it. A jury found the motel and guest both negligent, 
setting the guest’s fault at 97% and the motel’s at 3%. With damages 
tallied at $850,000, applying Illinois comparative negligence law, she won 
$25,500, roughly equaling her medical expenses. The guest wanted a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a retrial. Posner’s court affirmed 
denial of both. 
The opinion 
the jury did.83 To assess comparative fault, Posner assumes “the 
required comparison is between the respective costs to the [two 
sides] . . . of avoiding the injury. If each could have avoided it at the same 
cost, they are each 50 percent responsible for it.”84 Posner cites his 
illustration from a previous case supposing the cost of injury is $10; the 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) (stating that 
Han
cCarty v. 
uilders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern 
. 
mmon law rule that 
d States, 716 F.2d 418, 429 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (applying 
“ d was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic meaning of negligence”). 
 80. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 82–91 (Wassell v. Adams); 147–53 (M
Pheasant Run, Inc.); 154–69 (Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp.); see also Bhd. Shipping Co. v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 985 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. 
Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.). 
 81. See generally Izhak Englard, The System B
American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1980) (claiming that dissatisfaction with existing tort 
law can be attributed to a shifting in the aims and functions of tort law). 
 82. 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (applying Illinois law)
 83. Id. at 854. Posner’s apportionment review first notes how the co
makes contributory negligence a complete defense produced harsh results and is abolished in most 
states, including Illinois. Harshness arose because it focused on the single narrow point of a 
victim’s negligence; however that focus also made it simple and cheap to administer. Its 
replacement is comparative negligence which is costly and complex: it “requires a formless, 
unguided inquiry, because there is no methodology for comparing the causal contributions” of the 
two sides to a victim’s injury. Id. 
 84. Id. (citing Davis v. Unite
Illinois law)).  
 85. Id.  
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le 
per
he law that required Posner to review a 
jury verdict under an open-textured negligence standard hinging on 
                                                                                                                     
to the other. So the victim’s damages should be reduced by two-thirds (she 
would bear $6.66 in loss and recover $3.33 in damages). The Wassell 
jury’s fault apportionment at 97:3 meant, under this model, the issue was 
whether it could have found that the guest could avoid the attack at a cost 
less than 1/32 the cost to the motel. Posner asks: “Is this possible?”86 
The guest was careless opening the door at 1 a.m. without finding out 
who was there. But people are not so alert at that hour and “it wasn’t 
crazy” for her to think it was her fiancé.87 So the cost to a reasonab
son is not necessarily zero nor slight. On the motel’s side, costs of 
warning guests of dangers were trivial and would not have cost thirty-two 
times the cost to the guest of “schooling herself to greater vigilance,”88 as 
Posner describes the victim’s cost column. But such warnings are futile 
and Posner assumes “the jury was not so muddle-headed as to believe that 
the [motel’s] negligence consisted in failing to give a futile warning.”89 So 
Posner considers lack of a security guard, the only possibility for which 
cost evidence appeared. This was perhaps merely $50 per night but, even 
so, that “might be much greater than the monetary equivalent of the greater 
vigilance” on the guest’s part “that would have averted the attack.”90 
Based on this formal economic model, Posner decided a rational jury could 
have reached its verdict, though Posner said his court thought the motel 
was more than 3% responsible.91  
Several features of Posner’s Wassell opinion contrast with Cardozo’s 
traditional legal analysis in Pokora. First, predecessor judges, including 
Cardozo in Pokora, contributed to t
reasonable care. Posner contributes to the law an economic tool, in form 
more resembling a rule than a standard, that judges can use to review jury 
verdicts. The rule shares with Pokora a degree of judgment for contextual 
reasonableness. Yet it assumes, he says, sophistication juries lack,92 in 
contrast with Cardozo’s sense that juries are the place to resolve problems 
of human experience unsusceptible to rule-oriented resolution.93 Although 
not as strong as Holmes’ appetite for judges exerting control using rules, 
 855. 
he guest thought her fiancé was knocking, so would have opened the door even 
stating it is “artificial” to assume juries are “clear-thinking” and follow instructions). 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. T
knowing the neighborhood was dangerous. Such a warning might have kept her off local streets but 
that is not the pertinent danger. The motel could have warned her never to open the door in the 
middle of the night without knowing who was about, but it is “absurd to think” motels must give 
such obvious warnings, “any more than they must warn guests not to stick their fingers into the 
electrical outlets.” Id. 
 90. Id. at 856. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. (
 93. See supra note 63 (discussing Cardozo’s proclivity to affirm jury verdicts). 
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ctive decisions about 
pre
ards.  
Su
Posner’s model shows a taste for that appetite compared to Cardozo’s 
opposite inclination favoring juries and standards. 
Second, Posner’s application of the Hand formula in Wassell seems 
strained. The formulaic approach to negligence expressed in the Hand 
equation is most persuasive when evaluating refle
cautions in advance of accidents, like whether a railroad should equip 
trains with warning signals.94 The formula’s value degrades when 
evaluating more spontaneous decisions; it loses practical appeal if applied 
to a momentary lapse when injury was imminent, as with the Wassell 
victim’s weary decision in the middle of the night.95A more persuasive 
opinion would defend the jury’s verdict using intangibles Cardozo 
referenced in Pokora, like everyday experience, natural behavior, and 
customary knowledge.96 A persuasive opinion would likewise address the 
legal significance of the fact that the motel room had no phone.   
Third, even concerning reflective decision–making, the Hand formula 
can lead analysis away from relevant factors, like absence of a phone in 
the Wassell victim’s motel room, which Posner’s analysis disreg 97
ch problems with the formula attract extensive, often trenchant, 
criticism.98 True, Posner is not the only judge who embraces the Hand 
formula, and the Hand formula still enjoys academic support.99 Some 
scholars even argue that juries should be instructed to apply it.100 But few 
                                                                                                                     
 94. See Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 
he guest or motel, and writing the opinion was a tall order for 
any 
rp.). 
te 70, at 328–32; William E. Nelson, The Moral 
See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1016–19 
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1198–1206 (1994). 
 95. See DOBBS, supra note 53, § 145, at 340–43 (demonstrating the formula’s use when 
contemplating advance decisions). 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 41–45. Wassell’s facts are difficult with the real 
culprit being the rapist, rather than t
judge. But, given the difficult facts, a less abstract and more empathetic discussion would have 
been more persuasive. See Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules; Rape Victims and 
Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1434–37 (1999). Traditional legal analysis offers 
language for empathetic discussion that economic vocabulary lacks. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, 
HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 133–36, 168–91 (1985); Toni 
M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2101–02 (1989); Richard H. Weisberg, Law, Literature, and Cardozo’s 
Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 283, 309–15 (1979) (praising Cardozo’s style and use of 
language in particular); Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 
MERCER L. REV. 867, 868–73 (1988). 
 97. For additional examples, see infra text accompanying notes 154–69 (McCarty v. Pheasant 
Run, Inc. and Davis v. Consol. Rail Co
 98. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 3, 36–37 (1988); Keating, supra no
Perversity of the Hand Calculus, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 759, 759–62 (2001); Wright, supra note 6, at 
151–53. 
 99. See BARNES & STOUT, supra note 3, at 35; DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 73–74. 
 100. 
(1994). 
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C.  Cardozo’s Intuitions of Substantive Justice 
judges use the Hand formula101 and rarely give jury instructions based on 
it.102 They prefer the traditional approach Cardozo pioneered using legal 
expressions.103 That consensus testifies to which method the vast majority 
of judges deem superior; whether consensus is defensible can be tested by 
contrasting the substance of Cardozo’s negligence analyses with Posner’s 
Hand formula. 
Adams v.  can include 
eco
 Bullock104 shows how traditional legal analysis
nomic insights only partly embracing elements in the Hand formula—
and be stronger for it. A twelve-year old boy was electrocuted when he 
swung a wire into trolley wires that ran five feet under a rail bridge that 
spanned a roadway that pedestrians used and where children played. 
Cardozo’s court reversed a trial verdict for the boy that a split intermediate 
court had upheld. The trolley company owed a duty to take “all reasonable 
precautions to minimize the resulting perils,”105 but the evidence did not 
show it breached this duty. Wiring was placed so no one on the bridge 
could reach it. The wiring was not “a thing of danger” in the ordinary 
course106 but only when “some extraordinary casualty, not fairly within the 
area of ordinary prevision” occurred.107 Cardozo said of the probabilities: 
Reasonable care in the use of a destructive agency imports 
a high degree of vigilance. But no vigilance, however alert, 
unless fortified by the gift of prophecy, could have predicted 
the point upon the route where such an accident would 
occur. . . . At any point upon the route a mischievous or 
thoughtless boy might touch the wire with a metal pole, or 
fling another wire across it.  
If unable to reach it from the walk, he might stand upon a 
wagon or climb upon a tree. No special danger at this bridge 
warned the defendant that there was need of special measures 
of precaution. No like accident had occurred before. No 
custom had been disregarded. We think that ordinary caution 
                                                                                                                     
 101. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A 
Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 683, 704–07 (2002); Wright, 
supra note 6, at 148; Richard W. Wright, Negligence in the Courts: Introduction and Commentary, 
77 CHI.-KENT L. REV 425, 442 (2002); Zipursky, supra note 6, at 2013–17.  
 102. Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A 
Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 618–19 (2002). 
 103. See Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM J. JURIS. 
143, 145 (2002). 
 104. 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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did not involve forethought of this extraordinary peril.108 
Cardozo added concerning the burdens of precaution: 
There is, we may add, a distinction not to be ignored 
between electric light and trolley wires. The distinction is that 
the former may be insulated. Chance of harm, though remote, 
may betoken negligence, if needless. Facility of protection 
may impose a duty to protect. With trolley wires, the case is 
different. Insulation is impossible. Guards here and there are 
of little value. 
To avert the possibility of this accident and others like it at 
one point or another on the route, the defendant must have 
abandoned the overhead system, and put the wires 
underground. Neither its power nor its duty to make the 
change is shown. To hold it liable upon the facts exhibited in 
this record would be to charge it as an insurer.109 
rdozo thus offered a traditional, doctrinal resolutionCa . The first pair of 
quoted paragraphs, on probabilities, anchor the opinion, using rhetoric, 
com
d electric wire is dang us so a high degree of 
car
f the three later appearing in the Hand formula, leaving out 
ma
                                                                                                                     
mon sense (who has the “gift of prophecy”?), experience (what 
“mischievous or thoughtless boy[s]” might do) and “custom” (none 
disregarded here). The second pair, on burdens of precaution, reflects 
intuitive economic conceptions of the law’s underpinnings. It 
distinguishes, in practical terms, electric light that can be insulated from 
trolley wires that cannot.  
Posner endorses Adams as “proto-economic.”110 Posner notes Cardozo 
emphasized that un-insulate ero
e is required. But wires were situated so that no one using the bridge 
could reach them even by bending over. The result: danger to people on 
the bridge was slight. Likewise, duty hinges on facility to protect, hinting 
at cost of prevention, found essentially prohibitive. Posner says Adams, 
and the Hand formula, “elaborate on the longstanding approach, 
inarticulately economic, used by common law judges to decide negligence 
cases.”111 
Maybe, but Cardozo only weighed two variables—probability and 
burden—o
gnitude of loss.112 There is nothing inevitable about including all three, 
weighting them equally or how to weight them. It is possible, for example, 
 108. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 109. Id. at 94. 
 110. POSNER, supra note 8, at 117–18. 
 111. Id. at 117. 
 112. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 60. 
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s to suggest common law’s congruence with 
eco
strating Cardozo’s 
“in
                                                                                                                     
to weight probability and magnitude more than burden.113 Justifications for 
putting responsibility on those at fault include efficiency, fairness or 
both.114 Alternative justifications can yield different components and 
weights assigned to them. Posner and contemporary economic analysis 
favor a singular conception: to achieve an efficient level of accidents.115 
Cardozo and traditional legal analysis eschew singular conceptions, though 
emphasizing liability based on the notion of fault.116 True, the 
amorphousness of fault in traditional analysis can be frustratingly 
imprecise and allow indeterminate weightings while contemporary 
economic analysis can be appealing for its relative precision. The lingering 
problem is how much easier it is to speak of precision in negligence cases 
than to achieve it in fact. 
Posner also takes Adam
nomic theory, a scholarly theme in contemporary economic analysis of 
law offering to show law’s efficiency as a descriptive matter.117 Posner 
cites Adams for offering “as clear a statement as one might ask of the 
proposition that the optimal level of care is a function of its cost.”118 True, 
Cardozo finds no negligence as a matter of law, concluding that injury was 
unlikely and avoidance cost huge. But Professor Rabin points out how 
both Adams and Posner ignore the trivial cost of warning signs on the 
bridge.119 By not considering this alternative, Adams implicitly denies any 
legal duty to warn, but economic analysis would have to consider it. So the 
case is not an exhibit for law’s economic efficiency. 
Nevertheless, Posner clings to Adams as illu
timations of the economic approach.”120 He says formal economic 
analysis would strengthen the opinion, lamenting that Cardozo’s intuitions 
of substantive justice sometimes ran out and he lacked an “incisive” policy 
 113. E.g., Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) (U.K.).  
 114. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 60. 
 115. See Posner, supra note 79, at 33 (“[T]he dominant function of the fault system is to 
generate rules of liability that if followed will bring about, at least approximately, the efficient—the 
cost-justified—level of accidents and safety.”). 
 116. See KAUFMAN, supra note 8, at 252–53. 
 117. See generally George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient 
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) (arguing that legal rules tend to achieve efficient, rather than 
inefficient, allocative effects); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
51 (1977) (arguing that the common law’s presumed efficiency is related to the decision to settle a 
dispute in court); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-
Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003) (arguing that the common law tends to produce legal 
rules that enhance efficiency). 
 118. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 
GA. L. REV. 851, 894 (1981). 
 119. Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 
15 GA. L. REV. 925, 955–56 (1981). 
 120. POSNER, supra note 8, at 116–18. 
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listic.   
framework of the kind contemporary economic analysis provides.121 
Though intuitions of substantive justice can run out, economic analysis can 
come up short too, posing opposite problems. First, Posner employs the 
framework Cardozo lacked, but doing so can subordinate intuitions of 
substantive justice to the formal model, as Wassell suggests.122 Second, 
applying the “incisive” framework to Adams, incorporating costs of 
warning signs, would undermine, not strengthen, Cardozo’s opinion.123 
Third, Cardozo’s expository writing, which roughly aligned with his 
opinions,124 demonstrates that he would disfavor Posner’s purely 
economic approach to negligence as too narrow and simp 125
Cardozo’s preference for traditional legal analysis over economics 
appears firmly in Wagner v. International Railway Co.,126 where Posner’s 
critique reinforces the persuasiveness of Cardozo’s intuitions of 
substantive justice. In Wagner, a train crossing a bridge turned a curve 
with a violent lurch that threw a passenger from a car. From its stopping 
point, the passenger’s cousin walked back to the bridge, some four 
hundred feet, searching to rescue. He said the conductor asked him to and 
followed with a lantern, but the conductor denied both points. The rescuing 
cousin was injured after falling from the bridge, landing where a search 
party found the thrown cousin’s dead body. The trial judge told the jury 
the railway was not liable for negligence to the rescuing cousin unless the 
conductor invited him to proceed across the bridge and followed with a 
lantern. On that instruction, the jury exonerated the railway, but Cardozo 
said the instruction was wrong.  
“Danger invites rescue,” Cardozo famously wrote, after a factual 
recitation setting the harrowing scene.127 The railway owed the rescuing 
cousin a duty, given its breach of duty to the fallen cousin he sought to 
rescue.128 The railway argued that its duty to rescuers may cover 
                                                                                                                     
 121. Id. at 117–18 (“But fact and policy are opaque and elusive without a framework, and 
what Cardozo principally lacked in wrestling with cases in which intuitions of substantive justice 
ran out was an incisive framework for, or technique of, policy analysis such as modern economic 
analysis provides.  He can hardly be blamed for failing to use tools developed long after his death, 
however, and we can find intimations of the economic approach, notably in Adams v. Bullock.”). Id. 
 122.  See Bublick, supra note 96, at 1434–37. 
 123. See Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law’s Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2275–76 (1996) 
(reviewing WEINRIB, supra note 5). 
 124. Gary T. Schwartz, Cardozo as Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 306 (1999). 
 125. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 74–75 (1975) (describing 
negligence inquiries as “multiple and complex” and involving “a measurement of interests, a 
balancing of values, an appeal to the experience and sentiments and moral and economic judgments 
of the community, the group, [and] the trade”). 
 126. 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921). (Cardozo, J.). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Cardozo did not specify what duty the railway breached to the thrown cousin, but lists 
candidates as leaving car doors open, absence of guardrails between cars, allowing riding between 
cars, and taking the curve too fast. Id. at 437–38. 
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“spontaneous and immediate” action, but this rescuer had time to 
deliberate, walking 400 feet back across the bridge, and this terminated the 
railway’s duty.129 Cardozo allowed that “peril and rescue” must be “one 
transaction” so there is “unbroken continuity” between a wrong and 
mitigation efforts.130 But the link is not broken by exercising volition. 
Such an exception would swallow the rule. It does not matter whether a 
rescuer calculates the cost of rescue or is oblivious to it. Cardozo 
explained “iIt is enough that the act, whether impulsive or deliberate, is the 
child of the occasion.”131 Nor were the rescuer’s actions “a wanton 
exposure to a danger that was useless.”132 The rescuer thought his search 
on the bridge, not below it, would be productive, and his actions must be 
weighed in the context of the excited moment. Cardozo said people’s 
judgment errors resulting from that condition are not held against them.133 
The reasonable person standard adjusts to account for emergency.134 
Judgment errors are more tolerable, more expectable, in emergencies than 
in ordinary circumstances. Law does not assume people are rationally 
calculating cost estimators. In line with Pokora, Cardozo concluded that a 
rescuer’s actions “within the range of the natural and probable” made it a 
jury question whether his efforts were “foolhardy or reasonable.”135 
If extraordinary circumstances expand what is reasonable, recall the 
motel guest in Wassell, awakened by a knock at 1 a.m. Posner recognized 
the prospect of weariness and included that factor in the Hand formula 
assessment of precautions she reasonably could have taken. Though 
Wassell was not a rescue situation, Cardozo’s treatment of Wagner’s 
rescuer suggests he would recognize impaired capabilities in Wassell, let a 
jury hear the case and defer to its verdict. To that extent, Cardozo and 
Posner agree and likely would concur in results of each others’ opinions. 
But Posner probes using economic conceptions, estimating what it would 
cost the Wassell victim to “school[] herself to greater vigilance”;136 
Cardozo elucidated by rhetorical drama, “danger invites rescue.” These are 
both memorable and provide justification in the respective opinions, but 
which tools and vocabulary are more persuasive?137  
Posner cites Wagner to criticize Cardozo’s emphasis on tort law’s 
moral aspects and says Cardozo overlooked economic arguments 
 129. Id. at 438. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 49. 
 135. Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437, 438. 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 82–91 (analyzing Wassell). 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95 (amplifying the point on economic vocabulary 
compared to legal vocabulary). 
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supporting the outcome.138 First, Posner detects in Wagner a sense that 
danger should invite rescue as a matter of moral duty—but urges 
qualifying this with an economic limitation, only so long as “the risk to the 
rescuer is commensurate with the likely benefit to the person sought to be 
rescued.”139 Second, he says Wagner would also be stronger by noting that 
the railway’s own interest in promoting rescues supports holding it liable.  
These two economic points would not improve the Wagner opinion and 
could undermine it. Rescue cases like Wagner present two challenges to 
efficiency-oriented cost-benefit analysis Posner recommends. First, 
descriptively, traditional analysis protects rescuers in more settings—all 
settings not involving actions rash, wanton, or reckless—compared to 
economic analysis—protecting only those settings passing a cost-benefit 
test.140 The Wagner rescuer met Cardozo’s standard but, searching on the 
bridge when the place to search was down below, likely would fail 
Posner’s test. Second, as an empirical matter, it is difficult to believe that 
potential victims will take greater or less care depending on whether they 
would receive full or limited tort recovery later. If risk of self-injury does 
not encourage a person to take care, it seems doubtful that the prospect of a 
reduced tort recovery will change that propensity.  
Normatively, Posner’s critique succeeds in portraying Cardozo as a 
moralist and himself as an economist. Posner also asserts his own capacity 
to blend moral and economic viewpoints into a “pragmatic jurisprudence” 
that is “more than mere words.”141 By the same token, pragmatic 
jurisprudence must be more than mere formulas.142  The degree of 
pragmatism that jurisprudence offers may be inferred from how useful it is 
in other jurisdictions—and many jurisdictions follow Wagner, one of 
 138. POSNER, supra note 8, at 102. Incidentally, Posner reports the facts of Wagner incorrectly, 
stating that the train was in a wreck due to the railway’s negligence. Id. at 101. 
 139. Id. at 102. 
 140. See Wright, supra note 6, at 228–38 (criticizing Posner’s analysis of the famous rescue 
case Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871)). 
 141. POSNER, supra note 8, at 102. 
 142. Pragmatic jurisprudence likely would exhibit a characteristic of doctrinal thickness useful 
to enable resolving similar disputes in similar ways without regard to doctrinal categories. 
Cardozo’s Wagner opinion illustrates this jurisprudence. It fits into several frameworks, all 
producing the same result. Doctrinally, rescue cases entice analysis using alternative tools, 
including duty or proximate cause, as in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) 
(Cardozo, C.J.). See infra text accompanying notes 194–215. Each leads to talk of foreseeability. In 
Wagner, Cardozo uses duty, capturing in the phrase “danger invites rescue” a human proclivity to 
aid and, in the legal formulation, a normative judgment that neither causation nor foreseeability 
limits the duty that injurers owe to their victims’ rescuers. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF 
TORT LAW ¶ 63.05, at 347 (2d ed. 2003); see also ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 128 (discussing how 
Wagner’s rejection of the railway’s causation argument enables conceiving of rescue cases using 
tort law’s harm-within-the-risk test and reconciling it with Palsgraf); DOBBS, supra note 53, § 184, 
at 456 (considering whether Wagner is an exception to Palsgraf’s foreseeable victim holding or 
whether rescuers are within the scope of foreseeable risk). 
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Cardozo’s most famous opinions.143 Courts usually recognize that 
negligent injurers owe a duty not only to their victims but also to those 
trying to rescue them, at least so long as the rescuer’s steps are “not wholly 
abnormal or hopeless.”144 Contrary to Posner’s prescription, this is so 
whether the rescuer acted based on instinct or after formulating a 
satisfactory cost-benefit calculation.145 Wagner and Adams demonstrate 
the reliability of Cardozo’s intuitions of substantive justice, supplemented 
but not overwhelmed by economic insight, and infused equally with moral 
impulses expressed in distinctive but traditional style.146 
D.  Posner’s Hand Formula 
In contrast to Cardozo’s traditional legal analysis, consider two Posner 
opinions extending the Hand formula to translate legal principles into 
economic concepts. McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc.147 involved a fifty-
eight-year old business traveler who was assaulted at a large resort hotel. 
The guest’s second-floor room had a sliding door opening to an outside 
walkway from which stairs led to a courtyard with public access. That door 
had a lock and chain. After the guest returned one evening, a stranger 
attacked her. The sliding door had been closed and chained but unlocked, 
enabling the assailant to enter and await the guest’s return. A jury found 
the hotel not negligent; Posner’s court affirmed denying a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.  
Posner applied the Hand formula by determining “whether the burden 
of precaution is less than the magnitude of the accident, if it occurs, 
multiplied by the probability of occurrence. . . . If the burden is less, the 
precaution should be taken.”148 He acknowledged that applicable law does 
not define negligence this way, using the familiar “failure to use 
reasonable care” legal formulation. But that does not matter, Posner said, 
because both tools comprehend the same factors. The Hand formula 
translates legal formulations into economic terms. Posner accepts that the 
translation may be imperfect because lawyers do not routinely present 
143. See ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 128; DOBBS, supra note 53, § 184, at 456; EPSTEIN, supra 
note 53, at 266–67; SHAPO, supra note 142, ¶ 63.02, at 342–43. Many jurisdictions follow virtually 
all Cardozo opinions discussed in this Article. Although Wagner is among Cardozo’s most-cited 
opinions, most others discussed in this Article are even more frequently cited, and Cardozo’s 
opinions tend to be cited more, on average and adjusted for time, than Posner’s opinions. See infra 
note 338. 
 144. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 184, at 456. 
 145. EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 266. 
 146. See generally Stanley C. Brubaker, The Moral Element in Cardozo’s Jurisprudence, 1 
CARDOZO L. REV. 229 (1979) (arguing that the moral element in Cardozo’s jurisprudence 
complements his pragmatic approach to the judicial process). 
 147. 826 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) (applying Illinois law). 
 148. Id. at 1556. 
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juries with quantitative evidence the Hand formula contemplates. 149 But 
the formula offers useful analytical avenues, Posner suggests.  
The guest lost because she did not show the attack “could have been 
prevented by precautions of reasonable cost and efficacy.”150 She offered 
no evidence on the cost of changing locks, which Posner acknowledges 
was irrelevant because the door was unlocked. But this type of evidence 
exemplifies the sort of evidence the Hand formula probes. More on point, 
the guest did not offer evidence concerning other security measures the 
hotel could have taken. Posner searches for some. He mentions posting 
notices in all rooms warning guests to lock doors. He says this would be 
costly and, anyway, people know this so imposing such a cost would be 
wasteful. On the other side, the hotel provided a lock but the guest did not 
take the nearly costless precaution of using it, Posner reasoned.151  
Applying the Hand formula in McCarty, Posner says the common law 
and the Hand formula yield identical results. That may merely make 
economic analysis redundant; but if so, it is not obvious how applying it 
helps, except possibly to make explicit elements traditional analysis 
obfuscates. Offsetting the virtue of such clarity are adverse effects, such as 
how contemporary economic analysis led Posner to focus on factors the 
Hand formula probes (like locks or notices) and to disregard those outside 
its purview (like a hotel’s safety history, allocation of duties between 
 149. Posner explains:  
Ordinarily, and here, the parties do not give the jury the information required to 
quantify the variables that the Hand Formula picks out as relevant. That is why the 
formula has greater analytic than operational significance. Conceptual as well as 
practical difficulties in monetizing personal injuries may continue to frustrate 
efforts to measure expected accident costs with the precision that is possible, in 
principle at least, in measuring the other side of the equation—the cost or burden 
of precaution. For many years to come juries may be forced to make rough 
judgments of reasonableness, intuiting rather than measuring the factors in the 
Hand Formula; and so long as their judgment is reasonable, the trial judge has no 
right to set it aside, let alone substitute his own judgment. 
Id. at 1557 (internal citations omitted).  Some detect in this statement a softening of Posner’s 
commitment to the Hand formula’s rigid versions compared to his pre-judicial scholarship. E.g., 
Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean by “Causation” in the Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 433, 469 
n.132 (2008). 
 150. McCarty, 826 F.2d at 1557. 
 151. Connecting these examples of economic costs to traditional legal expressions of due care, 
Posner says the required care is that “which is optimal given that the potential victim 
is . . . reasonably careful; a careless person cannot by [being careless] raise the standard of care of 
[others].” Id. at 1557–58 (citing Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
Posner’s “no duty” formulation, repeated in several opinions, may overlook law requiring 
corrective precautions in response to negligence of others. See David W. Barnes & Rosemary 
McCool, Reasonable Care in Tort Law: The Duty to Take Corrective Measures and Precautions, 
36 ARIZ. L. REV. 357, 374–79 (1994). 
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hotels and guests, or comparative knowledge).152 Therefore, despite what 
Posner said, traditional law and the Hand formula do not necessarily 
comprehend the same factors, and imperfections translating law into 
economics are deeper than lawyer reticence to present quantitative 
evidence to juries. That reticence, moreover, is justified by how people 
(lawyers, judges and juries) focus not on artificial cost-utility matrices but, 
as Cardozo understood, on the roles, knowledge and intentions of 
individuals whose conduct law governs.153 
Furthermore, the Hand formula’s analytical avenues may lead to dead 
ends, as Posner’s opinion in Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corp.154 
illustrates. It affirms a jury verdict for a rail car inspector against his 
employer and a railroad arising from an accident when a long train in a rail 
yard moved while the inspector was under it. The inspector did not signal 
his presence under the train as federal law required155 and the train did not 
signal before moving as custom may have dictated. The inspector offered 
three grounds to support the verdict and Posner found one convincing. 
The winning argument asserted the railroad’s crew should have 
sounded the train’s horn or bell before moving it. Posner acknowledged 
the crew had no reason to believe anyone was in danger on the tracks. But 
there was a possibility someone needed warning about the moving train. 
Applying the Hand formula, Posner found the burden on the railroad, 
sounding an alarm, “vanishingly small.”156 Probability of loss was 
“significant, though not large,” considering accidents that could be averted 
by signaling.157 To determine benefits of precaution, Posner assessed not 
only the actual accident, but the “expected cost of any other, similar 
accidents that the precaution would have prevented.”158 In the 
nomenclature of Posner’s Hand formula, B < PL, so the defendants were 
negligent.   
Posner’s application of the Hand formula to the inspector’s two losing 
arguments shows how the formula can be irrelevant or unhelpful to 
negligence analysis. His disposition relied on rhetorical characterization 
and practical sense. First, the inspector argued that an employee who saw 
 152. For example, the McCarty guest presented evidence of nine break-ins through sliding 
glass doors at the hotel in the previous two years and that hotel managers expressed concern about 
defective locks on those doors.  Wright, supra note 6, at 263. In addition, it may have been the 
hotel, not the guest, who failed to lock the door; the guest may not even have known the door was 
there, for it was covered by drapery. Id. at 264–65. Posner’s failure to evaluate these factors may 
suggest it is difficult to incorporate them into the Hand formula, though traditional legal analysis 
makes it easy to do so.  
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47. 
 154. 788 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (applying Illinois law). 
 155. Id. at 1262 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 218). 
 156. Id. at 1264. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.   
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him drive in to the yard should have alerted those preparing to move the 
train that he was on the tracks. Posner rejected this, noting how the 
employee could not reasonably have assumed this driver would leave a 
vehicle to crawl under rail cars.159 The Hand formula could be used to 
classify this risk as too slight to take precaution against, but Posner 
dismisses it instead by simply calling it “rather absurd.”160 The appeal to 
what common sense deems absurd is persuasive, without needing to 
measure the risk or its relation to requisite precaution.161  
Similarly, the inspector claimed a train crew member should have 
investigated the track to see if anyone was on it. Posner rejected this claim 
as “even more fantastic.”162 The train spanned a mile and required an hour 
for someone to check under every car. This argument echoes Holmes’ 
stop-and-get-out rule from Goodman that Cardozo rejected, on pragmatic 
grounds, in Pokora—163 a rejection Posner endorses.164 This is a practical 
rejection of an impractical ironclad rule that would often be futile and 
sometimes dangerous, besides too costly. Again, the Hand formula could 
be fashioned to evaluate the cost part of the argument but it is not 
necessary and is not obviously helpful.165 After all, in Pokora Cardozo 
convincingly rejected the Goodman rule using  traditional legal analysis, 
as Posner acknowledges.   In Davis, Posner rejected the echo of the 
Goodman rule by calling it “fantastic,” not exactly quantifying it in the 
Hand formula. 
Further qualifications on the Hand formula appear from defense 
arguments in Davis based on federal law’s requirement that inspectors 
working under rail cars post blue flags in plain view to those in the yard.166 
This was defendants’ “strongest argument,” Posner said.167 Even so, blue 
flags were not as commonly used as defendants suggested. The inspector 
often worked under rail cars without posting flags and railroad employees 
knew this. Moreover, sometimes flags would not be “handy,” but 
inspectors still would work under cars, Posner said.168 Forcing this 
analysis into the Hand formula, Posner concludes: “[t]he burden of 
sounding the horn would have been trivial, and the expected benefits 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 1263. 
 161. See Wright, supra note 6, at 258–61 (noting how this purported application of the Hand 
formula shows the formula is “superfluous and implausible”); Gideon Yaffe, Reasonableness in the 
Law and Second-Personal Address, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 939, 963–65 (2007). 
 162. Davis, 788 F.2d at 1264. 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 40–45. 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65. 
 165. See Wright, supra note 6, at 258–61 (noting how this purported application of the Hand 
formula seems correct in result but “for reasons independent of” it). 
 166. Davis, at 1262 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 218). 
 167. Id. at 1265. 
 168. Id. 
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positive; for despite the blue flag rule there was some probability that an 
employee or invitee was working in or dangerously near the trai 169
Posner’s opinions in Davis, McCarty and Wassell illustrate innovative 
economic technique, but as justification, their relative narrowness makes 
them less persuasive than Cardozo’s broadly-framed opinions in Wagner, 
Adams and Pokora.  Posner’s opinions evoke a sense that economic 
analysis should shape people’s reasonable expectations rather than that law 
should reflect those expectations, as Cardozo thought.170 Cardozo stressed 
everyday experience as fundamental to negligence determinations,171 yet 
laypeople lack experience with formulaic expressions like B < PL. True, 
the basic formula reflects a lot of common sense and intuition and people 
need not be trained economists to appreciate that value. The trouble is how 
economic analysis can overwhelm legal principles at stake, disregarding 
important factors and exaggerating others, all of which can create tension 
with intuition. It seems defensible, then, that the vast majority of courts 
follow Cardozo’s traditional approach to negligence, with Posner among a 
handful of judges who prefer the Hand formula.172 
III.  LIABILITY 
Differences between traditional legal analysis and contemporary 
economic analysis of law permeate many tort doctrines, beyond basic 
issues concerning ordinary negligence and the Hand formula. Three 
contrasts concerning liability issues illustrate. The first concerns statutory 
violations, which Cardozo treated as negligence per se but Posner treats as 
factors in a Hand formula analysis. The second involves foreseeability and 
causation, contexts in which action and injury are not closely connected 
and where traditional legal analysis, in both Cardozo’s and Posner’s 
opinions, provides pragmatic solutions that elude contemporary economic 
analysis. The third raises matters more of technique, where Cardozo’s 
analysis, imposing negligence in a product liability case, shows capacity 
and persuasiveness less evident in Posner’s analysis, when determining 
whether to apply a standard of negligence or strict liability. 
A.  Statutory Violations 
 169. Id. at 1266. In Davis, Posner allows the overlooking of the inspector’s negligence when 
evaluating the defendants’ breach of duty, though in McCarty his formulation of the no-duty rule 
sets an injurer’s standard of care based on the assumption that others are careful and not negligent. 
Had the McCarty dictum been applied to Davis, the outcome would have been the opposite. See 
Barnes & McCool, Corrective Precautions, supra note 151, at 374–79; infra text accompanying 
note 327 (same point in context of Greycas, Inc. v. Proud). 
 170. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 172. See Englard, supra note 6, at 369; Zipursky, supra note 6, at 2002. Because Hand rarely 
used the formula and later abandoned it, perhaps the Hand formula should be renamed the Posner 
formula. See Wright, supra note 6, at 150–52. 
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Cardozo and Posner differ sharply on the tort consequences of statutory 
violations. For example, in Davis, the railroad inspector case discussed 
above, Posner disposed of defense arguments that the inspector violated 
the blue flag law by saying he rarely complied with it, that other 
employees knew this, and that often flags were not handy.173 In contrast, 
Cardozo, in Martin v. Herzog,174 treated statutory violations as negligence 
per se. Martin involved a couple, driving a buggy at night, hit by a car 
from the opposite direction. The wife, surviving her husband, sued the 
car’s driver for negligent failure to stay on the road’s right side. The 
driver’s defense was contributory negligence, arguing the buggy was 
traveling without lights in violation of state law. The trial judge told a jury 
driving without lights evidenced negligence but was not negligence itself. 
The jury found the driver liable and the couple without fault. Cardozo’s 
court affirmed a reversal, saying “the unexcused omission of the statutory 
[lights] is more than some evidence of negligence. It is negligence in 
itself.”175 
Martin is now the standard approach,176 especially in motor vehicle 
cases,177 but not the only one. Alternative approaches treat unexcused 
statutory violations as evidence of negligence (as the Martin trial court 
did) or as akin to departures from custom (much as Posner implied in 
Davis).178 Cardozo defended the per se approach on legalistic grounds. 
First, he anchored it in duty: “[T]o omit, willfully or heedlessly, the 
safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of another . . . is to fall short 
of the standard of diligence to which those who live in organized society 
are under a duty to conform.”179 Second, Cardozo denied that juries could 
excuse the duty: “Jurors have no dispensing power [to] relax the duty that 
one traveler on the highway owes under the statute to another.”180  
Among competing stances on the tort consequences of statuory 
violatoins,181 a striking contrast is between Cardozo’s per se approach and 
 181. Other rationales for the per se approach echo Cardozo’s point about law’s hierarchical 
 173. See supra text accompanying notes 166–69. 
 174. 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J.). 
 175. Id. at 815. 
 176. See ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 80–81; EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 147; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (2005) (Tentative Draft No. 1 2001). 
 177. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 134, at 318. 
 178. See DOBBS, supra note 53, at 317; EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 147. The evidence and 
custom approaches may overlap; variations treat statutory violations as a prima facie case for 
negligence (as Martin allows in dicta). See infra text accompanying notes 187–189. See generally 
Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se: What’s the 
Difference?, 77 OR. L. REV. 497 (1998) (examining the state of confusion surrounding Oregon’s 
various types of focused negligence statutes). 
 179. Martin, 126 N.E. at 815 (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. This reference to “dispensing power” evokes English monarchical privilege to suspend 
statutes but may not answer whether a per se approach or evidence/custom approach is better.  See 
DOBBS, supra note 53, § 134, at 317–18. 
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Posner’s treatment of violations as one factor in a Hand formula 
negligence test in Davis..182 The contrast is significant for two reasons. 
First, their treatments of statutory violations suggest how their approaches 
set different boundaries on judicial power. In seeing violations as 
negligence per se, Cardozo used rhetoric to anchor this statutory source of 
liability in fundamental duty. People, living “in organized society,” are 
duty-bound to conform to statutory mandates, and neither juries nor judges 
can dispense with that bond. Cardozo respected how the source of law in 
legislation imposes limits on the judicial role.  
In contrast, economic analysis requires measuring costs of compliance 
with statutes.,Tension between economic principles and positive law can 
result. In Davis, federal regulations required the inspector to take actions 
(post blue flags) he did not do. That could be negligence per se and 
provide a defense. Overlooking this, Posner measured competing 
prevention costs within the Hand formula. Posner’s economic and legal 
analyses are thus mutually antagonistic while Cardozo’s rhetoric and legal 
analysis are mutually reinforcing. Cardozo emphasized law; Posner 
emphasizes economics. A judicial opinion is more persuasive when 
accurately reflecting multiple sources of law production, including 
legislative, rather than disguising them. 
Second, the per se rule excludes evidence about whether a statute is 
good policy, is current or outdated, or provides other information useful to 
cost-benefit analysis.183 This reality reflects how Cardozo was less 
interested in cost-benefit analysis than, say, judicial-legislative power 
allocations, or whether community sense is better determined by 
legislatures or juries.184 Posner’s treatment of the blue flag rule in Davis as 
evidence in the Hand formula, akin to custom, elevates economic analysis 
                                                                                                                     
nature, legislation as functionally binding courts. See Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and 
Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 331 (1914). But courts taking this position absent clear 
legislative directive may be reflecting other rationales. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 134, at 317–18. For 
example, the per se approach offers certainty, which must be traded-off against the flexibility 
offered by the evidence and custom approaches.  Id.; EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 147. Some say the 
per se approach enables judicial control over juries. Clarence Morris, The Relation of Criminal 
Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REV. 453, 454 (1933). But it is not obvious why control is 
more important in statutory violation cases than in others or why other judicial tools like directed 
verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict are inadequate. See DOBBS, supra note 53, 
§ 134, at 317–18. Modern explanations, less legalistic or hierarchical than Cardozo’s, simply 
recognize the “awkwardness of juries tolerating what legislatures [have] forbid[den].” EPSTEIN, 
supra note 53, at 147. 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 166–69; see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 248–
49 (“[V]iolation of the statute might not be negligent for a particular [person], given [the person’s] 
costs of compliance relevant to the benefits of violation.”). 
 183. EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 147. 
 184. Cardozo is known for giving deference to other branches of government. See KAUFMAN, 
supra note 8, at 247–48, 250, 305, 308. 
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one
sources severing causation. But the evidence showed 
not
ugh he and Hogan disagreed 
about whether evidence in Martin justified invoking it.193 
above legal norms.185 Cardozo recognized many potentially contending 
values (as traditional legal analysis does); Posner lets one dominate (a 
tendency in contemporary economic analysis of law).186 It is axiomatic 
that such a unitary jurisprudence is more limited than a multi-dimensional 
.  
A final observation about Martin and Cardozo’s traditional legal 
analysis bears mention. After determining the victim’s statutory violation 
was negligence itself, Cardozo noted that to have legal significance, such 
negligence must be connected to injury.187 If the widow showed using 
lights would not have helped avert injury, then violation does not sustain 
the defense of contributory negligence.188 The widow could have 
presented evidence about other light sources to claim that, even if her 
buggy had lights, the car driver would have hit her anyway. The jury 
should then have been told omitting lights was negligence but only prima 
facie evidence of contributory negligence, subject to competing evidence 
about other light 
hing of the kind, Cardozo said.189  
Judge John Hogan dissented on this point, criticizing Cardozo’s 
treatment of the causal connection between negligent action and injury. 
Hogan marshaled trial evidence suggesting there was enough light from 
other sources to make the buggy visible to the driver. He complained that 
Cardozo’s opinion was “substituting form and phrases for substance, and 
diverging from the rule of causal connection.”190 Such rebuke to 
Cardozo’s propensity to persuade using rhetoric in legal analysis is 
familiar.191 But such critique of Cardozo’s rhetoric should not obscure the 
strength of his traditional legal analysis. Echoing Pokora,192 Cardozo, in 
Martin, offered causation as a tool to mitigate otherwise harsh results that 
a contributory negligence regime posed, tho
                                                                                                                     
 185. Economic analysis is elevated even above custom, for Posner reports as a fact that custom 
may have dictated the crew blowing the train’s whistle before moving it yet ensuing analysis 
evaluates the point in terms of estimated costs of doing so. Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 
bout, at least approximately, the efficient—the cost-
tin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920). 
ristic Cardozo flaw as “the substitution of words for 
1260, 1264–65 (7th Cir. 1986).   
 186. Posner, supra note 79, at 33 (“[T]he dominant function of the fault system is to generate 
rules of liability that if followed will bring a
justified—level of accidents and safety.”). 
 187. Mar
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 820 (Hogan, J., dissenting). 
 191. See William Powers, Thaumatrope, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1319, 1320–21 (1999). Posner 
echoes Hogan’s point when citing a characte
thought.” POSNER, supra note 8, at 118–19. 
 192. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
 193. To deal with the harsh results contributory negligence regimes posed by barring any 
recovery, courts found numerous ameliorating doctrines. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 145. 
30 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
                                                                                                                     
B.  Foreseeability and Causation 
A more subtle contrast between traditional legal analysis and 
contemporary economic analysis appears in cases presenting an attenuated 
nexus between action and injury. As Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad 
Co.194 illustrates, traditional legal analysis uses duty, foreseeability and 
causation principles to establish limitations on liability for such remote 
injuries. This is difficult terrain for economic analysis, however, because 
while pragmatic grounds support imposing such limitations, an efficiency 
rationale for doing so is elusive.195 Facing this problem in Stoleson v. 
United States,196 Posner’s opinion uses traditional legal analysis to defend 
the limitations, providing his own testament to its power. 
Palsgraf is a canonical exhibit of Cardozo’s traditional legal analysis 
and among the most prominent cases in American law.197 A passenger 
stood on a platform awaiting a train while another, carrying a fifteen-inch 
long package, rushed to catch a departing one. As the rushing passenger 
jumped aboard, one railroad employee pulled him onto the moving train, 
while another pushed him on from the platform. In the jostling, his 
package fell, exploding fireworks inside. The explosion knocked over 
scales “at the other end of the platform many feet away,”198 injuring the 
standing passenger.199 A jury found the railroad negligent, with liability 
 have barred recovery but, under prevailing comparative negligence law, reduced 
am
 
antics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553, 571–73 (1987) 
pra note 54, at 126; POSNER, 
 note 142, ¶ 55.02, at 302. 
 
These included an exception against bar when the injurer violated a safety statute, removal of bar 
when the injurer was more than merely negligent (such as grossly negligent), and the last-clear 
chance limitation (when the injurer, compared to the victim, had a final opportunity to avoid 
injury). Id. To this list, one may add a spin on Cardozo’s Martin opinion: the victim’s statutory 
violation is negligence per se, and contributory negligence is a defensive bar unless the victim 
proved causation between the other’s violation and her injury. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 191 
(doctrine of causation in contributory negligence can relax harshness of barring recovery). In 
contrast, in Davis, treating the inspector’s violation of the blue flag regulation as negligence per se 
would not
d ages. 
194. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  
 195. See Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of 
Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 445–48 (1985) [hereinafter Wright, Actual 
Causation]; Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: 
Unscientific Formalism and False Sem
[hereinafter Wright, Efficiency Theory]. 
 196. 708 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (applying Wisconsin law). 
 197. E.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 132; DIAMOND ET AL., su
supra note 8, at 16, 41–42; SHAPO, supra
198. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99. 
 199. Id. As a matter of style, some see Cardozo’s statement of facts in Palsgraf as a model. See 
HELENE SHAPO & MARSHALL SHAPO, LAW SCHOOL WITHOUT FEAR: STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS 155–56 
(2d ed. 2002); Richard C. Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 727, 728–29 (1978). 
As a matter of fidelity to the record, others see grounds for criticism. Posner calls it “elliptical and 
slanted.” POSNER, supra note 8, at 38–40. One claim is that Cardozo exaggerated the distance 
between the passenger, scales, and explosion. The victim sought to reargue the case on similar 
grounds; in denying the motion, the court per curiam said: “If we assume that the plaintiff was 
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affirmed by a 3-2 intermediate appellate decision. Cardozo’s court 
reversed, 4-3, deciding the railroad employees’ negligence to one 
passenger did not make it liable for injuries to another.  
Negligence, Cardozo said, is not actionable unless it invades a legally 
protected interest—violation of a right. So a passenger cannot assert 
breach of duty owed to another. Cardozo put the point concerning duty 
several ways. First, duty is defined by reasonably perceivable risk, within a 
range of apprehension, meaning something foreseeable. Second, “the orbit 
of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the 
orbit of the duty.”200 Third. “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines 
the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to 
others within the range of apprehension.”201 Cardozo thus delineated the 
nature of duty as a matter of law, and not for the jury.202 It is a 
distinctively legal, substantive notion, stressing a nexus connecting a 
wrongdoer’s breach of a particular duty to a particul 203
Judge William Andrews’ dissent took a broader view of duty: “Every 
one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that 
may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.”204 Negligence is not 
defined by duty, but as an unreasonable act affecting rights, not confined 
to those who might probably be hurt. If one person is justified to complain, 
anyone injured may assert liability, Andrews reasoned. For Andrews, the 
only limitation on liability for negligence is absence of proximate cause, 
based on “practical politics,” not philosophy or logic. Though it must be 
“something without which the event would not happen,” proximate cause 
means “that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of 
justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a 
certain point.”205 Andrews posed a series of questions to decide whether an 
action is the proximate cause of injury and found all supported requisite 
, The 
ibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425, 1481–85 (2003). 
graf, 162 N.E. at 100. 
uestion for the court, and 
course in the Law of 
t 1468–69. 
.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
nearer the scene of the explosion than the prevailing opinion would suggest, she was not so near 
that injury from a falling package, not known to contain explosives, would be within the range of 
reasonable prevision.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 164 N.E. 564, 564 (N.Y. 1928) (per curium) 
(denying motion for reargument). Cardozo probably wrote that. KAUFMAN, supra note 8, at 655 
n.32. Another objection is mischaracterization of the alleged negligence, which Cardozo takes as 
the employees’ jostling of the passenger when the allegation concentrated on how employees did 
not take precautions to deter passengers from boarding moving trains. See Richard W. Wright
Grounds and Extent of Legal Respons
 200. Pals
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 101 (“The range of reasonable apprehension is at times a q
at times, if varying inferences are possible, a question for the jury.”). 
 203. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1733, 1813–14 (1998); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs and Re
Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998); Goldberg, supra note 12, a
 204. Palsgraf, 162 N
 205. Id. at 103–04. 
32 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
cau
each judge 
use
r, who used both to enrich his 
opi
                                                                                                                     
sation in Palsgraf.206 
Palsgraf stimulates voluminous discussion for many reasons. 
Cardozo’s opinion is valued for its delineation of duty and how he 
fashioned it into a general liability limiting principle hinging on 
foreseeability,207 despite Andrews’ broader view.208 An important issue is 
the jury-judge divide:209 Cardozo, akin to Holmes in Goodman, thought 
reasonable people would necessarily agree that the remote passenger’s 
injury was not a foreseeable result of employees jostling another; 
Andrews, akin to Cardozo in Pokora, thought they could disagree. In 
addition, the duty-causation split between Cardozo and Andrews is a 
reason to discuss the opinion, especially because the doctrines 
d could have been applied to reach the opposite result.210  
Above all, Palsgraf is famous because of enduring tensions between 
the concepts of duty and causation211 and how courts diverge on whether 
to follow Cardozo, or Andrews,212 or both on different points. For 
example, Palsgraf reflects two disagreements, one attracting a wider 
following to Andrews and the other Cardozo.213 The first disagreement is, 
in a negligence case, where the liability limitation principle belongs—at 
duty or causation; courts generally follow Andrews’ view of locating it at 
causation.214 The second disagreement concerns the substance of that 
limitation, whether it should be based on the test of foreseeability or a 
broader notion of “practical politics;” courts generally follow Cardozo’s 
foreseeability test.215 A related reason for Palsgraf’s fame is how the 
doctrinal dexterity Cardozo and Andrews both displayed remains useful to 
contemporary judges, including Posne
nion in Stoleson v. United States.216 
In Stoleson, an employee of a government contractor handled 
nitroglycerin in a munitions plant. She began to suffer chest pains, but only 
on weekends. A year after starting work, she developed heart trouble. 
After years enduring the malady and several doctors denying her theory—
 206. Id. at 104–05. 
 207. See infra text accompanying notes 260–317. 
 208. See Heidi M. Herd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
IN LAW 333, 349 (2002). 
 209. See ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 132–33. 
 210. Cardozo could have applied proximate causation to conclude that the victim was outside 
the chain of jural causes (to use a phrase from Cardozo’s Wagner opinion), and Andrews could 
have applied duty analysis to say it was possible for a rational jury to decide the victim was within 
the range of foreseeable injury from employees jostling another passenger. 
 211. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 126. 
 212. ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 135 (“[C]ourts have never fully reconciled these two points 
of view. Sometimes courts employ Cardozo’s approach, sometimes Andrews’ approach.”). 
 213. See DOBBS, supra note 53, § 182, at 451. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. 708 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (applying Wisconsin law).  
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that pains were caused by handling nitroglycerin—she found one who 
confirmed it. Daily exposure caused artery expansion; withdrawal on 
weekends caused constrictions, yielding chest pains. Though the 
symptoms should have abated after stopping work at the plant, she 
continued to have them, which were diagnosed as hypochondria.  In a 
bench trial, the judge found the government negligent and awarded 
damages for related heart disease. But the party’s expert witnesses 
disagreed over whether hypochondria resulted from the employee’s heart 
trouble and treatment or was a pre-existing condition. The judge found the 
employee failed to prove the government’s negligence
ied associated damages. Posner’s court affirmed. 
The issue was whether the employee proved causation between the 
negligence and her hypochondria symptoms, but the trial judge’s 
conclusion posed an interpretive problem: did the employee fail to prove 
causation as a matter of law or fact?217 Posner invoked two traditional 
legal principles to test the judge’s conclusion in terms of legal causation. 
First, it could not mean liability would follow only if government caused 
the hypochondria since, under tort law’s well-settled thin skull rule, 
injurers take negligence victims as they are.218 It makes no difference that 
the employee was harmed only because of her vulnerability to that illness. 
Second, liability is not excused if the employee’s hypochondria symptoms 
were triggered by alarmist treatment of her physician. Tort law is equally 
well-settled that injurers are liable for aggravations to injury they 
originally cause.219 The government was negligent in exposing the 
employee to nitroglycerin and causing her heart condition. If a doctor 
negligently treated her heart illness and caused greater harm
ernment would be liable for the original and additional harm.  
But after thus suggesting probable reversal, Posner said a more 
plausible interpretation of the judge’s finding is the employee failed to 
prove causation as a matter of fact. The employee failed to prove her 
physical symptoms were caused by hypochondria and not some 
undiagnosed condition. Given that hypochondria is not well understood, 
the best reading of the trial judge’s conclusion is not that the employee 
failed to prove the government’s negligence caused her hypochondria 
symptoms, but that she failed to prove her physical symptoms were the 
 217. Id. at 1220. 
 218. Posner cites the classic Vosburg v. Putney, where an injurer was liable, not for causing 
underlying infection in the victim’s tibia, but because the injurer’s negligent kick exacerbated a pre-
existing condition and caused injury. Id. at 1221 (citing Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 
1891)). For criticism that Posner ignores a distinction within the thin skull rule between physical 
and mental injury, see J. Stanley McQuade, The Eggshell Skull Rule and Related Problems in 
Recovery for Mental Harm in the Law of Torts, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 19 n.34 (2001). 
 219. Stoleson, 708 F.2d at 1221 (citing Butzow v. Wausau Mem’l Hosp., 187 N.W.2d 349 
(Wis. 1971); Heims v. Hanke, 93 N.W.2d 455 (Wis. 1958)). 
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result of hypochondria rather than some unrelated condition. Posner’s 
exemplary traditional le
t Posner continued.  
Drawing on cases with lineage to Palsgraf, Posner found “additional 
confidence” affirming.220 These cases say that, even absent doubt about 
causation in fact, injurers may avoid liability for damages so remote and 
disproportionate to culpability that public policy justifies denying them. 
Posner raised this principle, articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 
Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital,221 on his own, the lawyers evidently not 
briefing it. In doing so, Posner signals Palsgraf-like limits on the 
employee’s claim. Howard is a descendant of Palsgraf, citing a
[I]n cases so extreme that it would shock the conscience of 
society to impose liability, the courts may . . . hold as a matter 
of law that there is no liability. An example of this is 
Palsgraf . . . [where Judge Cardozo] held that as a matter of 
law the plaintiff could not recover . . . . In a dissenting 
opinion . . . Judge Andrews argued the question of proximate 
cause [finding] that the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury 
was the negligence of defendant’s employees because their 
wrongful act had set in motion the sequence of events which 
produced the harm without any intervening cause. Logic 
seems to be on the side of the dissenting opinion, yet the 
majority opinion can be justified from the standpoint that 
judicial policy warranted the result. The conscience of socie
So Posner, sua sponte, drew on Wisconsin precedents with roots in 
Palsgraf, intimating that both duty and causation principles support the 
result in Palsgraf (and Stoleson). In writing about Palsgraf, Posner 
suggests it is not an interesting case, but an “esoteric problem,” and says 
Cardozo’s “engineered . . . minority solution” is little better than the 
“unsatisfactory” causation solution.224 Posner adds modest economic 
insights. Posner muses that on one hand, not imposing liability may yield 
insufficient precautions.225 Yet it was not the railroad, but its employees, 
who were negligent, and large organizations cannot control their workers; 
 220. Id. at 1224. 
 221. 217 N.W.2d 383 (Wis. 1974). 
 222. 55 N.W.2d 29 (Wis. 1952). 
 223. Id. at 34 (internal citation omitted). 
 224. POSNER, supra note 8, at 41. It is not clear that Cardozo’s solution is a “minority” one. 
See supra text accompanying notes 211–16. Nor does it seem accurate to characterize the problem 
as “esoteric.” True, case outcomes may not pivot on the issue, but the problem recurs and poses 
important conceptual challenges. 
 225. POSNER, supra note 8, at 37. 
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plus, the accident was highly improbable. So Posner concludes that 
imposing liability would not likely affect the injurer’s beh
 probability or magnitude of loss from this risk type.  
Stoleson and these musings imply that Posner would probably concur 
with Cardozo’s Palsgraf result denying liability, but be agnostic about 
resting it on duty or causation.226 After all, either legal ground can be 
supported by Posner’s economic justifications. And there are few other 
economic justifications, since efficiency rationales for imposing 
foreseeability limitations on tort liability are elusive.227 So it does not 
seem likely an opinion relying on those economic ideas would become 
canonical like the one Cardozo wrote,228 with its emphatic delineation of 
the traditional legal concept of duty and engagement with foreseeability as 
a limitation on liability. Thus, Posner’s economic insights on Palsgraf, and 
sua sponte invocation of Palsgraf-inspired judicial policy, especially in 
such a doctrinal opinion, reflect the power of traditional legal analys
odest utility of contemporary economic a
C.  Product Liability and Strict Liability 
More textured contrasts between Cardozo’s traditional legal analysis 
and Posner’s contemporary legal analysis concern technique. In 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,229 Cardozo’s most influential opinion, he 
used doctrine, especially duty and foreseeability, to create negligence 
liability for consumer product manufacturers at the dawn of the era of 
merchandizing and consumerism. Cardozo employed classical analogical 
reasoning and doctrinal classification to render a pragmatic opinion so 
persuasive and adaptive to socioeconomic change that it was rapidly 
followed in all other states.230 The opinion also reflects Cardozo’s 
normative preference for tort liability based on fault (negligence) over 
strict liability. Posner shares that preference but his attempt to justify it 
using contemporary economic analysis, in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad 
Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.231 (one of his most prominent opinions) 
does not command wide following or assent even among devotees of the 
 226. Elsewhere Posner embraces Cardozo’s Palsgraf opinion to focus on duty and 
foreseeability.  See infra text accompanying notes 278–90 (discussing Edwards v. Honeywell). 
 227. See Wright, Acutal Causation, supra note 195; Wright, Efficiency Theory, supra note 
195. 
 228. ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 132; DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 141; POSNER, supra 
note 8, at 16, 41–42; SHAPO, supra note 142, ¶ 55.02, at 302; Paul Brickner, Kaufman’s Cardozo: 
Judicial Biography as Legal History, 88 GEO. L.J. 1895, 1912 (2000) (reviewing KAUFMAN, supra 
note 8). 
 229. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).  
 230. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 197; DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 170; 
DOBBS, supra note 53, § 353, at 973; EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 389–92; POSNER, supra note 8, at 
33 n.1; SHAPO, supra note 142, ¶ 38.01, at 205. 
 231. 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (applying Indiana law). 
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economic approach. Posner’s opinion is also non-parsimonious compared 
to traditional legal analysis, which cou
ligence rather than strict liability. 
In MacPherson, the buyer of a car from a retail dealer sued the 
manufacturer for personal injuries, alleging negligence.232 The 
manufacturer defended by citing absence of a contractual relationship with 
the buyer—the formidable privity defense that precluded like suits 
before.233 Cardozo’s court affirmed a judgment that the manufacturer 
owed a duty to all buyers
234
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to 
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a 
thing of danger: Its nature gives warning of the consequences 
to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added 
knowledge that the thing will be used by [a person] other than 
the purchaser, and used without new tests [to discover 
danger], then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of
If such things are not made carefully, manufacturers are liable for 
injury to parties even absent privity. Cardozo restated prevailing settled 
law that manufacturers are liable only to direct buyers of their products. He 
then restated the equally established exception to this limitation for 
inherently destructive items, like poisons, explosives, and weapons—
things whose normal function endangers life. Related risks are foreseeable 
and that cr
tract.  
To counter the exception, the manufacturer urged that a car, unlike 
poison, is not an inherently destructive instrument. This would put it 
outside the “imminent danger” category and limit liability in accordance 
with contract. Cardozo responded that if a product, when negligently 
made, and used in its customary way, poses risk of personal injury, the 
product is dangerous because injury is a foreseeable consequence of use. 
Toiling with contending precedents in traditional legalistic ways to justify 
 232. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 138 N.Y.S. 224, 225 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912). 
 233. Id. It also defended by noting the wheels were manufactured by another company, with a 
reliable reputation. Id. 
 234.  MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. 
 235. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053 (emphasis added).  Cardozo limited manufacturer’s duty 
outside contractual relationships. First, a manufacturer must know of danger that is probable, not 
merely possible. Second, it must know that it is likely that others besides a direct buyer will use the 
product. Third, the manufacturer’s knowledge of danger and use must survive a proximate cause 
analysis. In MacPherson, all these limitations were met. Id. 
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cases holding manufacturers liable to people not in privity with them.236  
 
Cardozo summed up the essence of MacPherson:  
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life 
and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be 
foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put 
the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put 
its source in the law.237  
Cardozo was eviscerating privity by incrementally expanding the scope of 
legal duty, using traditional forms of analogical reasoning238 and the legal 
principle of foreseeability. This opinion highlights Cardozo’s pragmatic 
jurisprudence, evolving law by traditional means to address socioeconomic 
change.239  
As a matter of technique, Posner’s Indiana Harbor offers a good 
contrast. Posner tries to translate into economic terms traditional legal 
statements on whether strict liability or negligence applied when a 
switching line sued a chemical manufacturer to recover decontamination 
costs after a railcar containing hazardous chemicals leaked in its yard. 
Despite valiant effort, Posner’s economic analysis has attracted 
considerable criticism and dissent, even among devotees of the approach. 
Moreover, traditional legal analysis would have worked more 
parsimoniously.240  
 236. Id. at 1052, 1054 (citing Torgeson v. Schultz, 192 N.Y. 156 (1908) (classifying aerated 
water bottles that explode as inherently dangerous)); Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882) 
(classifying scaffolding as inherently dangerous when finding a scaffold’s builder liable to an 
injured workman though the builder lacked any contract with him); Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (finding a contractor not liable to a stagecoach driver for injuries suffered due to 
coach defects). Cardozo distinguished Winterbottom in part because the defendant was not the 
manufacturer and in part because the complaint in the case was technically deficient. Id. at 1054. 
 237. Id. at 1053. 
 238. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1–19 (1949). 
 239. Chief Judge Willard Bartlett, the lone dissenter, agreed with Cardozo’s statement of the 
privity rule and its inherently dangerous product exception. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055 
(Bartlett, C.J., dissenting). He disagreed about the sort of products in the previous line of cases. Id. 
Courts treated scaffolding and aerated water bottles as inherently dangerous products period, having 
nothing to do with negligent manufacture. Id. at 1056. Cardozo’s rationale for finding a car 
inherently dangerous is an unwarranted expansion of case law. Nor could Bartlett accept Cardozo’s 
attempt to distinguish Winterbottom; he found them analogous. Id. Any extension of liability 
beyond contract is for legislative branches, Bartlett said, which turned out an incorrect prophesy 
when dozens of courts followed New York’s lead. Id. at 1057. 
 240. Indiana Harbor can be criticized for applying tort law at all, whether strict liability or 
negligence, because the issues involved would better have been handled by contract law. See David 
Rosenberg, The Judicial Posner on Negligence Versus Strict Liability: Indiana Harbor Belt 
Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1219–20 (2007). Notably, 
Posner criticizes Cardozo’s MacPherson opinion on precisely the same ground. POSNER, supra note 
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The opinion interprets the Restatement (Second)’s factors delineating 
whether an activity is ultra-hazardous so that strict liability applies: (1) 
great probability of harm, (2) great magnitude of harm, (3) due care cannot 
eliminate risk; (4) the activity is not common; (5) the activity is 
inappropriate to a certain place, and (6) the relation between the activity’s 
community value to unavoidable risk. Posner reorganized these to show 
that analysis is and should be based on negligence principles. The first 
issue is whether due care can eliminate a risk, item (3), which reflects 
negligence as common law’s baseline.241 If activity can be reduced by due 
care and was not so reduced, negligence points to liability and there is no 
need for strict liability. If the activity cannot be reduced by due care, the 
issue is whether the activity can more safely be conducted elsewhere or on 
a lesser scale (items (5) and (6)). Strict liability creates such incentives, 
which are most appealing when the probability and/or magnitude of harm 
increases to great levels (items (1) and (2)). If the activity is common, the 
case for strict liability weakens (item (4)). 
Posner accepted that explosive chemicals are a common context 
warranting strict liability as they are dangerous even when handled 
carefully and liability threats may promote precautions. But that does not 
automatically support strict liability over negligence. Exposing 
manufacturers to strict liability for moving products in the stream of 
commerce may be too sweeping, foreclose inquiry into relevant factors and 
not deter leakage accidents. After all, no one suggested “the leak in this 
case was caused by the inherent properties of acrylonitrile.”242 
Carelessness was the cause. The issue was whose carelessness and this was 
unclear.243 Posner also rejected the argument that the activity was ultra-
hazardous because of the yard’s proximity to Chicago. One must apply the 
liability regime most likely to control targeted actions, Posner explained. 
Imposing strict liability on a chemical manufacturer for transport spills 
does not create incentives for manufacturers to prevent recurrence. The 
only choices are relocating or reducing the activity, and it is not obvious 
how manufacturers can do that for shipping means or routes.  
Posner thus struggles to breathe analytical economic content into the 
Restatement’s black letter law, a difficult task given that the Restatement 
8, at 108–09 (stating otherwise a “tour de force of judicial casuistry,” Cardozo missed the principal 
pragmatic issue of whether manufacturer responsibility to injured consumers is better addressed 
using tort law principles as Cardozo did or contract law). 
 241. Indian Harbor,916 F.2d at 1177.  
 242. Id. at 1179. 
 243. Id. Candidates included: the car’s owner (for related maintenance and inspection); the 
car’s manufacturer (for possible failure to inspect it); the railroad (for maintenance of cars it 
possessed); or even the switching line company itself. Id. Posner also uses this technique of listing 
all other potential defendants to justify denying liability in Edwards v. Honeywell. See infra text 
accompanying notes 278–290.  
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was not born of economic insight.244 He says the rationale of strict liability 
is to reduce frequency of highly dangerous activities, and opines that 
negligence is more likely to produce that result. If negligence is enough to 
achieve desired reduction, it is preferable to strict liability, he reasons. But 
economic models do not make it clear that negligence is more likely than 
strict liability to reduce frequency of highly dangerous activities. The issue 
is whether negligence or strict liability will induce the optimal level of 
care. In economic models, optimal means minimizing total costs of 
accidents plus prevention. The standard theoretical model suggests that 
negligence and strict liability yield the same optimal outcome, the 
difference being who bears residual loss.245 In strict liability the injurer 
does; in negligence the victim does.  
Professor Epstein notes that the result may change by adding all other 
costs to the equation, like administrative costs and the costs of error.246 For 
example, negligence means fewer, but more complex, lawsuits.247 Strict 
liability means all incentives are on those pursuing the activity to 
determine ex ante optimal ways and locations—probably a more efficient 
way than courts making those decisions in hindsight.  Error costs may 
likewise be lower under strict liability than negligence.248 The upshot is 
strict liability may have an edge over negligence, raising doubt about 
Posner’s Indiana Harbor opinion in economic terms.  
On the other hand, Professor Abraham suggests the case may be correct 
on its facts, but is uncertain whether it can be generalized.249 He 
emphasizes the difference between activity effects and safety effects.250 
Negligence liability creates incentives to provide optimal safety and 
shifting to strict liability adds no new ones. Strict liability adds incentives 
to avoid dangerous activities and pursue safer ones. It can create incentives 
that negligence cannot.251 This is because negligence liability does not 
force actors to internalize all activity costs fully whereas strict liability 
does. But to achieve those gains requires good substitutes for the subject 
activities, not always possible—probably not on Indiana Harbor’s facts 
concerning transport, as Posner suggested.252 
 252. 916 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.). Similarly, though strict liability deters 
 244. See Alan O. Sykes, Strict Liability versus Negligence in Indiana Harbor, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1911, 1922 (2007). 
 245. See generally Brown, supra note 3 (analyzing from an economic perspective the legal 
standards for negligence). 
 246. EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 95–96. 
 247. See Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence, 6 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 433, 435 (1990). 
 248. See id. 
 249. ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 179. 
 250. Id. The pioneering work examining activity levels is Steven Shavell, Strict Liability 
versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). 
 251. Id. at 172. 
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On Indiana Harbor’s facts, Cardozo would not have recast the 
Restatement’s factors into economic terms or concentrate on efficient 
deterrence incentives, as Posner did. He would have analyzed doctrinally, 
probing duty, foreseeability, and fault. But his method would still likely 
reach Posner’s result. In Palsgraf, Cardozo put ultra-hazardous activities 
to one side, yet his emphasis on duty (and foreseeability) reflected his 
agreement with prevailing law preferring liability based on fault over strict 
liability.253 Cardozo’s traditionalism could justify that result by stressing 
the flexibility of negligence compared to the rigidity of strict liability,254 
and enabling probing fault and just compensation, in addition to efficient 
deterrence.255 Although Posner’s analysis hints at the flexibility point, 
noting how strict liability forecloses inquiry into relevant factors, Posner’s 
economic preoccupation obscures flexibility’s significance. 
It seems ironic that Posner exerts such energy in Indiana Harbor to 
justify negligence over strict liability in economic terms when traditional 
legal analysis so readily defends applying negligence. Flexibility animates 
Cardozo’s traditional legal analysis, ranging from Palsgraf’s denial of 
liability, addressing a vigorous and influential dissent, to MacPherson’s 
influential expansion of liability, overcoming formidable doctrinal hurdles. 
Posner’s application of traditional tools in Stoleson, like causation, reflects 
that kind of flexibility too. Cardozo’s Martin rule of negligence per se for 
statutory violations limits judicial flexibility, but respects other sources of 
legal duty that enlarge law’s capacity to contribute to social organization. 
Indeed, legislatures generally are better positioned to determine what 
hazardous activities should be reduced, and judges using traditional legal 
analysis can hold actors who violate resulting law negligent per se. Davis 
and Indiana Harbor show how Posner’s contemporary economic analysis 
lacks that capacity.  
                                                                                                                     
by creating incentives to find safer ways or locations, it may not reduce risk and may over-deter. 
See Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for Abnormally 
Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611, 634 (1998); Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented 
Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 354 
(1996). As Professor Dobbs notes, even the oft-repeated idea that people will move to safer places 
under strict liability compared to negligence is not incontestable. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 351, at 
965. One can move recreational blasting but it is not always feasible to move blasting for subways, 
tunnels or highways. Similar limitations apply to transportation of dangerous goods.  
253. See Palsgraf v Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (noting cases involving liability 
without fault are “rare exceptions, survivals for the most part of ancient forms of liability, where 
conduct is held to be at the peril of the actor”); KAUFMAN, supra note 8, at 253 ( Cardozo “regarded 
strict liability not as a reform but as an archaic survival . . . [reflecting his] general sense of the 
moral element in law. He did not wish to impose liability without irresponsible behavior.”).  
 254. See Vernon Palmer, A General Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability, 62 
TULANE L. REV. 1303, 1354 (1988); supra text accompanying notes 35–61. 
 255. See Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 
MICH. L. REV 1266 (1997). 
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IV.  DUTY 
This Part addresses tort cases involving third party claims against 
contracting parties in contract, tort, or both. These claims raise advanced 
problems underscoring the need for the broad framework of justification 
that traditional legal analysis provides and that contemporary economic 
analysis can support but not supplant. A primary traditional legal tool to 
evaluate such claims is duty, which tended to replace privity in 
determining whether to recognize third-party rights. This discussion 
reveals Cardozo’s felicity in developing duty as a way both to limit and to 
recognize liability and Posner’s debt to Cardozo. It shows not only the 
value, but the necessity, of traditional legal analysis, and how economic 
insight plays a subordinate role.  
A.  Third Party Remoteness  
Cardozo used the legal concept of duty to establish limitations on 
liability to third parties in two seminal cases—H.R. Moch Co. v. 
Rensselaer Water Co.256 and Ultramares v. Touche, Niven.257 Mochproved 
pivotal to Posner when addressing similar problems in Edwards v. 
Honeywell.258 In all three cases, a service provider breached a contract to 
its counterparty, and a third party, who would have benefited from 
performance, sued. All three opinions deny liability, primarily on the 
grounds established in Moch—absence of duty, based on the remote nexus 
between the claimant and the contract. Posner amplifies Moch’s legal 
rationale with economic ones that, while supportive, are not more 
persuasive.  
In Moch, a warehouse owner whose property was damaged by fire sued 
a company under contract to supply a city with water.  While the contract 
was in effect, a fire spread to the warehouse, yet the company failed to 
supply water to hydrants to contain it. Cardozo rejected the owner’s claims 
in both contract and tort. The contract claim portrayed the owner as a 
third-party beneficiary of the city-company contract. Third parties enjoyed 
such status but only if the contracting parties manifestly intended that. 
Cases allowing third-party enforcement were classified as creditor—259 
when the promisee owed the third party a debt—or donee—when the 
promisee-third party relation justified inferring that the promisee bargained 
to get  the promisor to make a gift to the third party (as when aunts gets 
uncles to promise to transfer property to nieces).260 Moch did not fit either 
category. To allow liability of city contractors to citizens would stretch the 
 256. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.). 
 257. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, C.J.). 
 258. 50 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (applying Wisconsin law). 
 259. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 270 (1859). 
 260. Seaver v. Ransom, 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918). 
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idea of third-party beneficiaries too far. It is not reasonable to infer that 
cities and their contractors form service contracts intending that citizens 
could recover damages from the contractor for breach, Cardozo explained. 
Allowing the tort claim would likewise mean liability for city 
contractors “unduly and . . .  indefinitely extended,” Cardozo said.261 
Under the owner’s theory, the company’s contract created a duty of non-
negligence and supply guarantee enforceable by anyone who would benefit 
from the bargain. True, tort law’s duty of care exposes the duty-bound to 
liability for breach.  But the liability issue requires examining how “the 
relation and its attendant duty are established.”262 One must assess “the 
conduct that engenders the relation.”263 This relation was too indirect. 
Cardozo supported this reckoning by invoking the hoary distinction 
between nonfeasance and misfeasance, observing that the company may 
have “[withheld] a benefit” but did not create an injury.264 Absence of a 
direct relationship and mere failure to confer the benefit doomed the 
owner’s tort claim.265 
Duty is often taken for granted in tort cases.266 It may appear only in 
the shadow of other analytical tools, like when duty is owed to foreseeable 
victims for foreseeable injuries (as in MacPherson) but not for 
unforeseeable ones (as in Palsgraf).267 Yet absence of duty can be central. 
This is illustrated by the subtle distinction between nonfeasance (where 
duty may not exist) and misfeasance (where undertaking action may carry 
with it a duty to act non-negligently). Moch is often criticized  for 
Cardozo’s use of this distinction.268 After all, a car driver cannot escape 
liability by saying he opted not to apply the brakes.269 Clear criteria are 
elusive for distinguishing innocent from culpable inaction; a reliable 
approach may characterize the context and behavior at issue.270 If so, in 
Moch, why the water company breached—reasons for inaction not the fact 
of inaction—may be important, though Cardozo did not consider this.271 
 261. Moch, 159 N.E. at 899. 
 262. Id. at 898. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. Cardozo also dismissed the owner’s assertion of breach of statutory duty. Id. at 899. 
 266. See W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 698–99 
(2008); Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty”, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265, 266 
(2006). 
 267. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 125. 
 268. See Warren A. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. 
L. REV. 913, 920–21 (1951) (calling Moch Cardozo’s “most unsatisfactory” torts opinion, focusing 
on the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction without probing the role of the contract). 
 269. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 315, at 856. 
 270. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 315, at 856. 
 271. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 125. Professor Epstein says Cardozo “mysteriously” 
said beginning to act, so that stopping would cause affirmative harm, not just withholds a benefit; it 
creates a duty. EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 272. He says such talk is “oft-repeated” but may be 
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These criticisms are valid, yet there is a place for duty in the Moch 
analysis. One difficulty in Moch is the contractual relationship. The 
warehouse owner is a stranger to the contract. That status implicates the 
limits of liability set by privity then in force or, today, limits in third-party 
beneficiary doctrine. At the time of Moch, the old privity rule had 
weakened and third-party beneficiary doctrine was expanding. In Moch, 
Cardozo set outer limits in an opinion representing the “leading 
discussion” of the doctrine and its scope.272  
Cardozo is also routinely criticized for failing to emphasize in Moch the 
terms of the city-supplier contract. It was a fixed price contract for water, 
not a pricing structure that would compensate the supplier for risks of 
extensive structural damage for breach.273 Readers have to work hard to 
uncover this notion in Cardozo’s opinion. They also must toil to see 
another doctrinal limitation on contract damages: even if the citizen could 
recover something, costs of structural damage would be consequential 
damages and probably not recoverable.274 On this branch, again, it is 
doctrinally responsible to say this means the supplier owed the warehouse 
owner no duty.275  
Despite criticism, New York continues to follow Moch276 and other 
courts facing similar facts tend to agree.277 Posner found Moch vital in 
Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc.278 in using duty as a limitation on liability in a 
negligence case. The opinion addressed a widow’s claim against a fire 
alarm provider alleging that her fireman husband died because the provider 
negligently delayed calling the fire department. The result was a weaker 
floor in a burning house through which the fireman fell.  Posner’s court 
affirmed summary judgment for the provider, saying it owed no duty of 
care to the fireman. 
Posner assumed the provider breached a duty of non-negligence (not 
contractual duty) to the homeowner–subscriber by failing to keep current 
information and that the fireman’s death was a consequence. He 
emphasized this is a tort, not a contractual, duty because the widow was 
not asserting the fireman was a third-party beneficiary of the owner-
provider contract. The issue was whether the tort duty extended to the 
fireman. Posner completed this framing of the opinion with wonderment 
about “the elusive concept of ‘duty,’” saying “[w]hy duty should be an 
“verbal hocus-pocus” and explains why modern courts instead say providers are liable if services 
are not rendered with reasonable care. Id. 
 272. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 870. 
 273. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 321, at 871; EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 272. 
 274. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 341 (1854). 
 275. Posner joins the two common criticisms of Moch. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 110. 
 276. See Strauss v. Belle Realty, 482 N.E.2d 34, 35–36 (N.Y. 1985). 
 277. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 321, at 870–71 & n.4 (citing cases presenting different facts or 
disagreeing with Moch). 
 278. 50 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (applying Wisconsin law). 
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issue in a negligence case is not altogether clear . . . and the quest for an 
answer may guide us to a decision.”279  
For guidance, Posner turned to Cardozo, especially Moch and Palsgraf. 
Posner noted that modern thought equates negligence with carelessness but 
this is ahistorical.280 Negligence originally was limited to carelessness in 
performing a duty, whether undertaken freely or by law. The duty 
limitation eroded during the nineteenth century but, as negligence liability 
expanded, courts sought limitations and found them in duty.281 A threshold 
issue became whether a duty existed. For example, bystanders have no 
duty to warn strangers of peril. This duty limitation appears in the separate 
lines of cases following Palsgraf (limitation on duty owed to 
unforeseeable victims) and Moch (limitation on duty owed by water 
companies and other utilities to citizens). These lines intersect on the 
Edwards facts.  
Posner assessed arguments for and against duty limitation cases. He 
introduced Judge Henry Friendly as opposing the duty limitation.282 The 
only time to talk about duty, Friendly thought, is when someone was 
careless. Why should carelessness be excused because a victim or harm 
was unforeseeable?283 If the rail workers in Palsgraf did not enable getting 
the package-toting passenger onto the train, the bystander would not have 
been hurt. If the water company in Moch performed its contract by 
supplying water, the warehouse would not have burned. And if this alarm 
company had kept its files current, this fireman would not have perished.  
In contrast, two economic arguments support the duty limitation, in 
addition to grounds Cardozo provided. First, enterprises, whose liability is 
usually in question, cannot control employees, yet are liable under 
respondeat superior for consequences of employee negligence within the 
scope of employment. Enterprise carefulness does not eliminate liability 
risk. This suggests a rationale for excusing liability of unforeseeable sorts. 
It will not reduce the risk of accidents. A railroad cannot know its 
passengers pose explosive risks and a water company does not know the 
probability of fires.  
Second, more relevant to Moch cases than Palsgraf cases, is 
determining who is in the best position to prevent particular accident types. 
Liability should be placed on them to minimize costs. To illustrate, Posner 
used the notion of lines of defense. The first line of defense against injury 
from fires is preventing fires from starting. The second is the water 
 279. Id. at 485–87. 
 280. For discussion of this history, see generally Cardi & Green, supra note 266 (chronicling 
“[t]he concept of duty in tort law”); Esper & Keating, supra note 266 (analyzing duty in tort law). 
 281. Edwards, 50 F.3d at 488.. 
 282. Id. at 490 (discussing Petition of Kinsman Transit, Co., 338 F.2d 708, 721–26 (2d Cir. 
1964) (Friendly, J.). 
 283. Id. 
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company to supply water to fight them.284 But it cannot control those 
responsible for the first line of defense. So it may make sense to excuse 
them from liability, putting the burden on potential victims. 
In Edwards, Posner deemed arguments favoring duty limitations 
stronger than those, like Judge Friendly’s, challenging them. First, pace 
Cardozo, this accident was unforeseeable, if that word “is given the 
practical meaning of too unusual, too uncertain, too unreckonable to make 
it feasible or worthwhile to take precautions against.”285 It would be hard 
for the provider to know what would be necessary to meet its legal 
obligations in a regime without duty limitations. Second, the provider had 
no way to control fire risk at subscribers’ homes. It lacked ability to reduce 
the risk or cost of accidents or to control the risk firemen take fighting 
fires.286 Third, the alarm service was at best a third line of defense, after 
the homeowner and fire department certainly, and maybe after many other 
potential defendants—the maker of the furnace where the fire started, 
furnace service companies, suppliers of the wood that built the floor that 
weakened so rapidly, and even the house’s architect or builder.287  
So Posner restates duty and foreseeability principles Cardozo’s cases 
developed and defends them with economic insight focusing on least cost 
avoidance and imaginary lines of defense. The economic insight may make 
Edwards more persuasive than relying solely on Cardozo’s traditional 
legal analysis that examines the nexus among parties to define the scope of 
duty and orbit of liability. On the other hand, the economic models 
dubiously assume parties have knowledge of least cost avoidance at the 
time accidents occur, weakening its justification.288 The full burden of 
justification can be discharged by delineating duty, as Cardozo did, 
according to reasonably perceivable risk, within a range of apprehension, 
and setting the orbit of liability accordingly.289 It cannot be fully 
discharged by citing least cost avoidance and lines of defense, whatever 
persuasive support they add.290 
 284.  Id. 
 285. Id. at 491. 
 286. Id. at 490–91. 
 287. Id. at 491. Posner also used this “list potential defendants” technique in Ind. Harbor Belt 
R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 288. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Nuno Garoupa, Least-Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of 
Common Safety, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 235, 245 (2009); Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict 
Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1992). 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 190–202 (quoting Cardozo’s delineation of legal duty 
in Palsgraf). 
 290. Posner’s wonderment about what duty is doing in a negligence case may itself be a cause 
of wonderment. To quote Professor Epstein’s treatise: “The basic tort of negligence contains the 
following elements: duty; standard of care; breach of duty; causation; and damages.” EPSTEIN, 
supra note 53, at 189; see also DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 270. On the other hand, torts 
scholars have long struggled with the concept of duty in negligence law and theory, and until 
recently it may have been underappreciated. See, e.g., Cardi, supra note 266, at 698–99; Esper & 
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The capacity and persuasiveness of this use of traditional legal analysis 
also appears in Cardozo’s Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,291 applauded for 
its aversion to imposing indeterminate liability to indefinite numbers of 
third parties, though now a minority position on denying third-party claims 
for negligent misrepresentation. A lender sued accountants claiming 
negligence and fraud in the certification of a company’s financial reports 
on which the lender relied. The firm knew an “indefinite and wide” 
number of third parties might rely on the certified reports to supply funds, 
though the firm did not know identities. The reports showed a solvent 
company when the company was insolvent. Cardozo said the evidence 
supported a finding of auditor negligence.  
But Cardozo said a jury could find the firm liable to the lender only if 
the firm owed the lender a duty to act with the same care the firm owed the 
company that hired it. Cardozo concluded that the firm did not owe the 
lender such a duty. The firm owed the company two duties, one “imposed 
by law to make their certificate without fraud, and [one] growing out of 
contract to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling.”292 
The firm owed lenders “a like duty to make it without fraud” but no duty 
“to make it without negligence.”293 To hold otherwise “may expose 
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class,” Cardozo wrote, reversing all aspects of 
lower court rulings.294  
Cardozo observed that “[t]he assault upon the citadel of privity is 
proceeding in these days apace.”295 But the assault was not unlimited, 
particularly when “beneficiaries of the promise are indeterminate or 
general.”296 Quoting Moch, the promise must “bespeak the assumption of a 
duty to make reparation directly to the individual members of the public if 
the benefit is lost.”297 Citing MacPherson, Cardozo acknowledged tort law 
may make negligent manufacturers liable for “unreasonable risk of serious 
bodily harm” even absent privity.298 That did not mean liability extends to 
Keating, supra note 266, at 266; John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: General Principles and the John W. Wade Conference, 54 VAND. L. REV. 639, 642 
(2001); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 203, at 1738–39. While Posner grounds Edwards in 
absence of any provider duty to the firefighter, scholars synthesizing the case reclassify the holding 
subtly. For example, Professor Dobbs reports the case in terms of absence of duty and explains that 
absence on the ground that the harm was unforeseeable because the provider would find it difficult 
to determine appropriate product pricing or care to cover liability exposure. DOBBS, supra note 53, 
§ 287, at 779.  
 291. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, C.J). 
 292. Id. at 444. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 444, 450. 
 295. Id. at 445. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. (citing Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928)). 
 298. Id. (citing MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)). 
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economic harms absent a closer nexus than exists between a lender and an 
auditor-company contract. Bodily harms differ from economic harms.299 
So negligence liability is bounded by contract. In contrast, fraud liability is 
a matter of law and the evidence, including about negligence, supported 
concluding that a reasonable jury could have found fraud.300 
Ultramares remains the law in New York, modified to address factual 
variations that still concentrate on Cardozo’s indeterminacy point.301 Other 
states take different approaches concerning the scope of third-party 
recovery for negligent misrepresentation. At the opposite end, a few states 
allow recovery by those who foreseeably and reasonably rely upon an 
expert’s opinion.302 A middle position, taken by the Restatement, allows 
recovery to a limited group of third parties if the provider intended to 
supply its opinion to persons in that limited group or knew its client 
would.303 Even so, Ultramares is a “paradigm case” and Cardozo’s 
concern about indeterminate liability is “often-repeated.”304 Legal 
concepts of foreseeability, reasonableness, intention and knowledge 
remain the flexible factors courts use to assess the issue in terms of duty, 
as Cardozo did.  Posner is more critical of Ultramares, as the following 
section disc
B.  Reliance on Misrepresentation 
A final cluster of Cardozo-Posner opinions illustrates how duty 
provides a basis to recognize liability to third parties for misrepresentation, 
justifiable entirely on doctrinal grounds, with a supporting role for 
economic theory. The cases echoing Ultramares, pose an analytically 
 299. This distinction is embedded in tort law’s traditional economic loss doctrine. See 
generally All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying 
Wisconsin law and discussing the utility of tort law’s economic loss doctrine). 
 300. This branch of the case holds that opinions offered based on knowledge by a maker who 
lacks requisite knowledge may constitute fraud. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 54, at 347. This was 
not novel, as liability for fraud to third parties despite lack of privity was recognized as early as the 
1700s—and still is. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 480, at 1370; EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 570. What was 
notable is its point that evidence of negligence may be a basis to support inferring fraud. DOBBS, 
supra note 53, § 480, at 1370. Ultramares also is an exception to a general rule that 
misrepresentations of opinion, as opposed to fact, are not actionable. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 
54, at 347. 
 301. See, e.g., Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1084 
(N.Y. 1992); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 116–18 (N.Y. 
1985); White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 318 (N.Y. 1977). 
 302. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 480, at 1373 (noting Mississippi and Wisconsin). The New 
Jersey Supreme Court adopted this approach, but in 1995 New Jersey’s legislature essentially 
reversed it. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 143 (N.J. 1983); Carl Pacini et. al., At 
the Interface of Law and Accounting: An Examination of a Trend Toward a Reduction in the Scope 
of Auditor Liability to Third Parties in the Common Law Countries, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 171, 182 
(2000).  
 303. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 752 (Cal. 1992).  
 304. ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 286; see also DOBBS, supra note 53, § 480, at 1372. 
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identical issue: when can a third party hold a professional liable for breach 
of duty it formally undertook to another. Cardozo explored several 
doctrinal avenues to reach his result; Posner ultimately follows similar 
routes, adding economics to the inquiry, attesting not only to the power, 
but to the necessity, of traditional legal analysis. 
In Glanzer v. Shephard,305 a contract to buy and sell beans set price 
according to weight sheets to be certified by an expert. The seller paid the 
certifier, the receipt saying payment was made “by order of” seller “for G. 
Bros,” a reference to the buyer. After certification and delivery, the buyer 
determined the beans weighed less than certified and sued the certifier for 
damages. Cardozo’s court upheld a directed verdict for the buyer by 
reversing an intermediate appellate court which thought the buyer’s only 
remedy was against the seller given buyer-certifier non-privity.  
Cardozo said the basis for imposing liability is duty. The duty is 
imposed by law, from certifier to both seller and buyer, though the buyer 
did not contract with the certifier. Neither the certification nor the buyer’s 
use of it was indirect but were “the end and aim of the transaction” 
between the seller and certifier.306 True, the seller ordered it, but everyone 
knew the buyer would use it. Further, the certifier held itself out “to the 
public as skilled and careful in [its common] calling.” The task of 
certifying carried a duty to do so “carefully for the benefit of all whose 
conduct was to be governed.”307 The duty arises from a contractual 
relation but need not be bounded by contract princi 308
Cardozo also explored other grounds for the result. He repeated the 
notion about common callings and said regarding a hoary distinction used 
in Moch: “It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though 
gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if 
he acts at all.”309 He culled and distinguished other lines of cases involving 
economic loss, emphasizing: “The controlling circumstance is not the 
character of the consequence, but its proximity or remoteness in the 
thought and purpose of the actor.”310 He noted cases saying lawyers 
certifying title are not liable to third parties like lenders but only when 
unaware of the certificate’s intended use—a lawyer knowing his opinion 
will be used to induce another to act is liable.311 Cardozo said it is also 
possible to put the case in terms of third-party beneficiary law or principal-
 305. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922) (Cardozo, J.). 
 306. Id. at 276. 
 307. Id. at 276. 
 308. Id. (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916)). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. The case is thus easy to square with Palsgraf. The scope of duty in Glanzer is 
expressed in a contract to encompass all “whose conduct was to be governed,” a delimited 
population. Id. The asserted but rejected duty in Palsgraf would have extended, not by contract, to 
an unlimited population. Palsgraf is thus akin to Moch. 
 311. Id. (citing cases from six states). 
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agent. Regardless, they all give the same result. The basic idea of duty is 
simplest.  
Posner says Glanzer illustrates Cardozo’s “moralizing tendency.”312 
This is based on how Cardozo stressed the buyer’s reliance, which was 
readily foreseeable, so that, in Posner’s words, “the moral sense of the 
commercial community imposes a duty of care.”313 Posner translates this 
emphasis and sensibility into economic terms to mean the buyer lacked 
ability to protect itself.314 Imposing the duty is justified to promote 
flexibility and efficiency in commercial exchange because without liability 
buyers must hire their own certifier. To Posner, this shows that 
“[c]ommercial morality is perhaps the same thing as efficiency, and 
Glanzer is an even more persuasive decision when the link is made 
clear.”315  
Posner’s critique of Glanzer is thus substantially identical to his 
critique of Wagner and invites corresponding rejoinders.316 Cardozo’s 
opinion is persuasive and thick, offering numerous doctrinal grounds using 
reliance, foreseeability, duty, and emphasis on the nexus of the 
relationship; it is not obvious how equating commercial morality with 
economic efficiency or invoking incapacity for self-protection would 
strengthen it.317 
Certainly those two economic propositions could not justify the 
Glanzer conclusion absent the legal analysis, as discussion of Posner’s 
Greycas, Inc. v. Proud318 confirms. It raised an issue substantially 
identical to Glanzer, which Posner could have cited and followed, though 
he instead cited and distinguished Ultramares. The opinion addressed a 
lender’s suit against a borrower’s lawyer for malpractice and negligent 
misrepresentation. The borrower needed financing for a farm but all the 
borrower’s assets were encumbered. The borrower got a loan purporting to 
be secured by those assets, the lender relying on a borrower’s lawyer letter, 
addressed to the lender, falsely reciting that he conducted lien searches and 
that the assets were unencumbered. Posner’s court affirmed a district court 
damages award, rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that he owed the lender no 
 312. POSNER, supra note 8, at 99. 
 313. Id. at 101. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See supra text accompanying notes 138–39. 
 317. Posner may overstate criticism of Cardozo when saying he failed to mention that the 
seller’s retention of the certifier was merely formal given that its service was substantively rendered 
to and for the buyer. POSNER, supra note 8, at 100. The seller was not harmed by the certifier’s 
breach and would not sue. There would be no effective legal remedy against the certifier for breach 
unless the buyer could claim one. That is the thrust of Cardozo’s opinion, when stressing the 
buyer’s reliance and the nexus of the certifier to the buyer-seller exchange. Cardozo’s opinion could 
have been improved by noting this point, which is a legal, not an economic, one. 
 318. 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) (applying Illinois law). 
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duty.319  
Posner explained that malpractice protects clients and that lawyers owe 
no duty of care to a client’s adversaries. If malpractice is limited to 
breaches to one’s client, the lawyer is not liable to the lender. But Illinois 
discarded the privity requirement for malpractice so non-clients have 
claims too, though this requires proof that the attorney-client relationship’s 
“primary purpose and intent” was to benefit the claimant.320 That law 
“describes this case exactly” (or is even stronger because the borrower 
retained the lawyer solely to get this loan).321 Negligent misrepresentation 
required only slightly different analysis, Posner noted. The claim can seem 
straightforward: the lawyer intended the letter to induce lender reliance, 
making him liable for all material misrepresentations in it. But concern 
about indeterminate liability requires attention. Courts limit it in ways akin 
to those applicable to malpractice claims.  
Posner introduced Ultramares, noting how modern malpractice cases 
have analytically similar facts, and Ultramares was a negligent 
misrepresentation case. Posner called Ultramares “a famous opinion by 
Judge Cardozo” but asked why “privity of contract [was] required for 
liability just because the negligence lay in disseminating information 
rather than in designing or manufacturing a product?”322 He noted the 
“privity limitation in products cases had been rejected, in another famous 
Cardozo opinion, years earlier.”323 Posner volunteered an economic 
account for the difference, shunning Cardozo’s distinction between bodily 
and economic harms.324 He said privity reflected judicial concern that 
excessive liabilities on information producers could reduce production of 
socially valuable information.325 Information producers cannot always 
recover returns on investment because law’s property rights system in 
 319. Id. at 1568. The lawyer admitted misrepresentation but denied liability because he had no 
duty to the lender. Posner said this argument treats the lender’s claim as malpractice not negligent 
misrepresentation, despite the lawyer insisting the lender’s sole claim was negligent 
misrepresentation.  The lender insisted it was asserting both. Posner could not understand why the 
parties were so insistent.  “Legal malpractice based on a false representation, and negligent 
misrepresentation by a lawyer, are such similar legal concepts . . . we have great difficulty in 
holding . . . them apart in our minds . . . .” Id. at 1563. Still, the inter-party wrangling induced 
Posner to discuss each claim. Posner also wondered why the lender did not assert fraud. The choice 
was curious because negligent misrepresentation invites the defense of comparative negligence, 
which the lawyer asserted, but that is no defense to fraud. Posner speculated that the lender was 
concerned that the lawyer’s insurance policy excluded coverage for fraud or wished to avoid 
heightened pleading standards applicable to fraud claims. Id. at 1562. 
 320. Id. at 1563 (quoting Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ill. 1982)). 
 321. Id.  
 322. Id. at 1564. 
 323. Id. (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)). 
 324. See supra text accompanying note 298-99. 
 325. Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing William Bishop, 
Negligent Misrepresentation Through Economists’ Eyes, 96 L.Q. REV. 360 (1980)). 
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information is incomplete. They contribute social value without capturing 
all of it. The result may be under-production of socially valuable 
information. 
Yet many states, including Illinois, reject Ultramares, perhaps because, 
as Posner speculated, information markets are more robust now than 
earlier or producers can capture full value of information they contribute. 
Still, courts discarding Ultramares’ privity requirement to allow third 
party negligent misrepresentation claims do so cautiously, heeding 
Cardozo’s admonitions about indeterminate liability. Some courts 
emphasize particular justifying facts, as where a surveyor offers an 
“absolute guarantee for accuracy.”326 Illinois cases, decided under 
Restatement § 552, limit third party negligent misrepresentation claims to 
discrete classes of persons induced to rely.  
Under both lines, the Greycas lawyer was liable: in practicing his 
profession, he gave a letter intending to guide the lender’s decision so the 
lawyer had to use due care but did not. Posner added an economic 
justification to impose liability even under the “absolute guaranty” 
approach to avoiding indeterminate liability. Information about property 
liens is of limited social value compared to its private value. It need not be 
distributed widely. So law need neither provide incentives to produce it 
nor protect those who produce it carelessly. Professionals negligently 
misrepresenting such information to non-clients breach a duty of care to 
them.327 
 326. Id. at 1564–65 (citing Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d 656 (Ill. 1969)). 
 327. Posner rejected the lawyer’s defense of comparative negligence, saying the lawyer did not 
show the lender failed to exercise due care. Id. at 1566. This produced a definition of due care 
Posner developed in McCarty and Davis: “Due care is the care that is optimal given that the other 
party is exercising due care.” Id. at 1566 (citing McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 
1557 (7th Cir. 1987); Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1986)). Posner 
added: “It is not the higher level of care that would be optimal if potential tort victims were 
required to assume that the rest of the world was negligent.” Id. at 1566. So the issue was whether 
the lender was careless in not conducting its own lien searches and Posner concludes, as a matter of 
law, it was not. Law does not require duplicative precautions in such quotidian settings and the 
lender was reasonable when relying on the lawyer. Id.  
This determination as a matter of law is unusual, for contributory negligence is usually an issue 
for juries. SHAPO, supra note 142, ¶ 31.02, at 160–61. It is also oddly focused on the economic 
rationale of duplicative efforts that are wasteful, when the point can be reached readily on 
traditional legal grounds. An injurer’s actions may be non-negligent, as a matter of law, if not so 
risky because it could reasonably assume others would minimize the risk. DOBBS, supra note 53, 
§ 162, at 391. That is what Posner means when saying due care standards assume other people are 
careful, non-negligent. But this does not depend on opposing costly duplication of work and may 
overstate one’s right to assume others are non-negligent. See supra notes 151, 169. The conclusion 
can be justified on traditional legal grounds, including that the risk is within socially tolerable limits 
as a basic principle of negligence law. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 162, at 391. More simply, as Posner 
noted, the bank was reasonable when relying on the lawyer and that alone justifies excusing it from 
any obligation to duplicate his work.  
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Posner’s Greycas opinion is elaborate and long (5,073 words).328 Its 
traditional legal analyses of malpractice and negligent misrepresentation 
are strong. Its discussion of the economics of information offers plausible 
explanations for both doctrines and for Ultramares and its legacy. Greycas 
aids understanding and supports the legal decision that the lawyer owed 
the lender a duty. The result is a thorough opinion, providing economic 
accounts of old and prevailing law alike.   
Yet consider two alternatives to identical or nearly identical facts 
justifying the result using traditional legal analysis. Chief Judge Bauer 
concurred in Greycas, in a 94-word opinion collapsible into two dozen 
words: the lawyer intentionally misrepresented facts to induce the lender to 
make the loan and the lender justifiably relied on those misrepresentations 
to its detriment.329 Or consider Cardozo’s opinion in Glanzer, nearly spot 
on,330 though Posner does not cite or discuss it. Glanzer took 1,691 words 
when the privity doctrine had some force, exploring the contours of legal 
duty; Posner uses three times that many words in Greycas when the privity 
doctrine was long dead, working through economic accounts of traditional 
legal principles.  
True, Glanzer offers no economic analysis. But it reaches the same 
result, persuasively and more briefly. Traditional legal analysis played the 
decisive role, as it invariably did in Cardozo’s opinions, including Moch 
and Ultramares. Even in Posner’s Greycas opinion, as in Edwards, legal 
concepts of duty, foreseeability, reliance, and reasonableness played 
starring roles. Economic insights (lines of defense, least-cost avoidance, 
the economics of information) played supporting ones. The supporting 
roles are unnecessary. Though perhaps harmless and sometimes 
persuasive, economic analysis can be less parsimonious, as Greycas and 
Part III’s discussion of Indiana Harbor suggest.331 Worse, too much 
emphasis on economic analysis can impoverish, as Part II’s discussion of 
rigid application of the Hand formula highlights.332 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 328. Greycas is long whether compared to Posner’s average during the period of 3,100 words; 
to those of other federal judges then; or to those of federal judges in Cardozo’s era. See WILLIAM 
DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 143–44 (1996) (noting that a random sample of 
Posner’s first decade of opinions showed an average length of about 3,100 words); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 153 (1999) (estimating average opinion 
length in federal courts in Cardozo’s era as about 2,500 words and in Posner’s era about 4,050 
words). Greycas is also long compared to other opinions this Article surveys: Cardozo’s average is 
2,771 words and Posner’s average is 4,779 words. 
 329. Greycas, 826 F.2d at 1568 (Bauer, C.J., concurring). 
 330. See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra text accompanying notes 236–52. 
 332. For a discussion of Wassell v. Adams, McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., and Davis v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., see supra text accompanying notes 65–103, 147–72. 
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Comparative evaluation of Cardozo and Posner torts opinions 
evidences the strength of traditional legal analysis over contemporary 
economic analysis. Law’s reluctance to provide clear negligence rules and 
to give juries discretion is based on traditional legal reasoning Cardozo 
elaborated and which Posner defends by repeating him.333 Posner’s rigid 
version of the Hand formula is an innovative economic approach to 
negligence, but pales in capacity to Cardozo’s approach that enables 
contextual evaluation of relevant factors. Practical notions such as the 
nexus of exchange relationships and associated legal principles, like 
reliance, duty, and foreseeability, are central to legal justification, while 
economic notions, such as efficient deterrence, least-cost avoidance, and 
lines of defense are not. Posner’s own traditional techniques add evidence 
that this approach to law is more capacious and persuasive compared to 
economic analysis.   
So it may be unsurprising that there are reasons to believe the economic 
approach to tort law is declining and traditional legal analysis absorbing 
it.334 First, judges do not widely use economic analysis in tort cases, 
especially not in negligence law.335 Even Posner’s most famous torts 
opinions, such as Indiana Harbor, are not widely cited by courts.336 In 
contrast, Cardozo’s opinions, in MacPherson, Palsgraf, and other cases, 
gained canonical status quickly337 and enduringly.338 Second, within the 
academy, despite impressive scholarship illuminating economic analysis of 
 333. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 334. See Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer 
Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1188–89 (2008). See generally Bernstein, 
supra note 1 (observing the broadening of law and economics in recent decades and its functional 
absorption into mainstream legal thought). 
 335. See supra note 172 and sources cited therein.  
 336. See Rosenberg, supra note 240, at 1222. 
 337. See, e.g., CHARLES A. KEIGWIN, CASES ON TORTS (3d ed. 1929) (reprinting three Cardozo 
opinions, including MacPherson and Palsgraf); HARRY SHULMAN & FLEMING JAMES, JR., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1942) (reprinting ten Cardozo opinions, including seven of 
those featured in this Article, see supra note 34); LYMAN P. WILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1939) (reprinting nine Cardozo opinions, including seven of the ten still 
reprinted in current casebooks, see supra note 34); Bernard L. Shientag, The Opinions and Writings 
of Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 597 (1930) (reviewing the style and content of 
several Cardozo opinions).  
 338. A Westlaw citation review conducted August 6, 2009 shows courts favorably reference 
Cardozo opinions discussed in this Article far more often than Posner opinions discussed, even 
adjusted for opinion age. In order, the average annual number of positive case citations to those 
opinions since issuance dates follows (noting which Posner wrote): Palsgraf (19.4), MacPherson 
(11.8), Ultramares (9.7), Glanzer (6.5), Moch (5.6), Greycas (Posner) (3.2), Martin (3.0), Wagner 
(2.9), Indiana Harbor (Posner) (2.8) and Pokora (2.6), followed by the five other Posner opinions 
and trailed by Adams. Compilations of this data, and delineations according to total citations and 
citations in secondary authorities, which do not vary significantly from these, are available on 
request. 
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tort law,339 a growing literature challenges its descriptive accuracy and 
normative appeal.340 The method’s earlier successes may be due less to 
capacity or persuasiveness than to alluring theoretical novelty, offering a 
simpler way to view old, vexing problems.  
True, traditional legal analysis can obfuscate as much as it clarifies.341 
One appeal of contemporary economic analysis may be to clarify and 
avoid obfuscation,342 a longstanding quest for something akin to scientific 
method in law,343 particularly for Posner’s approach to tort law.344 Yet it 
does not always clarify, at best doing so for things it can measure and 
model.345 It oversimplifies.346 One appeal of traditional legal analysis, 
even when it obfuscates, is how it can capture complex human reality by 
offering flexibility in application.347 And at least since Cardozo’s time,348 
lawyers know, accept, and deal with its limits, appreciating that all is not 
reducible to bottom line expressions.349  
 339. See, e.g., BARNES & STOUT, supra note 3, at 39; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at312–
N: THE U ANALOGY IN L ARGUMENT 
(200
arency and Determinacy in Common Law 
: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC 
 
(198
sis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: 
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 110–11 (1995). 
N MIND (1930). 
al Aims of Moral Theorizing, 
28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 287–90 (2008). 
    
13; Brown, supra note 3, at 323; Coase, supra note 3, at 1–2; Hylton, supra note 3, at 1501–02.  
 340. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 10–25; Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 234–36; Bayern, 
supra note 6; Englard, supra note 6, at 359; Grady, supra note 6, at 397; Green, supra note 6, at 
1605–06; Moorhouse et al., supra note 6, at 667–68; Perry, supra note 6, at 988; Wright, supra note 
6, at 146–53; Zipursky, supra note 6, at 2001–02.  
341. See, e.g., LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASO  SE OF EGAL 
5) (presenting and challenging this criticism); Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal 
Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517 (1998) (arguing that there is no special type of reasoning 
which is unique to lawyers); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning, Semantics, Pragmatics, and the 
Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1996) (presenting a 
detailed model of reasoning by analogy); Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, 
Objectivity and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1993) (discussing the Critical Legal Studies 
movement against traditional analytic jurisprudence); Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 761, 765 (2006) (book review). 
 342. See generally Jody S. Kraus, Transp
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287 
(2007) (defending the usefulness of economic analysis in law). 
 343. See JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE
THOUGHT AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY 157–73 (2007); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s 
Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 51–53 (1983); Michael Wells, Scientific Policymaking and the 
Torts Revolution: The Revenge of the Ordinary Observer, 26 GA. L. REV. 725, 734–37 (1992). 
344. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 219–23
0) (discussing Posner’s contributions to economic tort theory and their flaws); James R. 
Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics and the Reconfiguration of 
American Tort Law Theory, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 275, 316–21 (1997) (noting Posner’s economic 
approach to tort law as resembling scientific quest). 
 345. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analy
Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1895, 1901–09 
(2007). 
 346. 
 347. See Singer, supra note 1, at 939–40. 
 348. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODER
 349. See Jason Brennan, Beyond the Bottom Line: The Theoretic
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economic calculus, better than law, distinguish when service providers 
Although some argue that economic analysis, focused on welfare, 
accommodates all imaginable factors,350 more plausible accounts point out 
numerous factors it disregards.351 The vocabulary and tools of economics 
may be too blunt to capture all the human experience that would comprise 
an assessment of social welfare, wealth, or utility. Issues and cases this 
Article evaluated illustrate some of these limitations when compared to 
traditional legal analysis. 
Many things cannot be measured at all, such as the costs to a tired 
person of schooling herself to greater vigilance,352 and others can be 
measured only in rough extremes, such as the prohibitive costs of putting a 
trolley wiring system underground353 or the “vanishingly small” costs of 
sounding a train’s horn before moving it.354 Law does not require 
motorists at rail crossings to get out of their vehicles because of a practical 
sense that flexible standards work better than rigid rules and not based on 
comparative costs of that to other steps.355 Nor does law require rescuers 
to compute unfathomable costs and gains of rescue, but protects them so 
long as their efforts are not rash or wanton.356 Ordinarily, a hotel’s safety 
history, difficult to measure, is vital to evaluating its conduct towards 
guests, though it is easier to estimate the costs of changing locks or giving 
notice.357  
Compliance with laws, like using lights for nighttime driving358 or 
posting blue flags when inspecting railcars,359 is not inevitably a pure 
matter of cost but has independent value and offers useful bright lines. No 
cost-benefit calculus can determine when injury is so remote from action 
to excuse liability, whether jostling explosives-toting rail passengers360 or 
exposing hypochondriac workers to nitroglycerin at a munitions plant.361 
Factors other than costs and benefits bear on responsibility for safety of 
manufactured products362 and shipping hazardous chemicals.363 Nor can 
                                                                                                                     
 350. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968, 
oleman, supra note 1, at 1538; David Dolinko, The Perils of Welfare 
 
f). 
n).  
 
977–78, 980 (2001). 
 351. See, e.g., C
Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 363–84 (2002) (book review); Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare 
Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 862–88 (2002). 
 352. See supra text accompanying notes 65–103 (discussing Wassell). 
 353. See supra text accompanying notes 104–25 (discussing Adams). 
 354. See supra text accompanying notes 154–72 (discussing Davis). 
 355. See supra text accompanying notes 35–64 (discussing Pokora). 
 356. See supra text accompanying notes 126–46 (discussing Wagner).
 357. See supra text accompanying notes 147–53 (discussing McCarty). 
 358. See supra text accompanying notes 174–93 (discussing Martin).  
 359. See supra text accompanying notes 154–72 (discussing Davis). 
 360. See supra text accompanying notes 194–215 (discussing Palsgra
 361. See supra text accompanying notes 216–228 (discussing Stoleson). 
 362. See supra text accompanying notes 229–239 (discussing MacPherso
 363. See supra text accompanying notes 240–55 (discussing Indiana Harbor).
56 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
d such points and made related intuitions motifs of 
his
               
under contract with one party should be excused364 or held responsible for 
third party losses.365 
Cardozo understoo
 opinions. He appreciated that people are heterogeneous, that reasonable 
expectations vary, and that law should reflect these realities not force them 
to change. He was practical and flexible, using a multi-dimensional 
jurisprudence to shape law and its processes. He applied traditional tools to 
render persuasive opinions that continue to influence law today. Posner 
holds different views on many of these points, reflected as motifs of his 
opinions. While deferential to juries, Posner does not show much 
confidence in them, calling them unsophisticated and non-abiding of 
instructions, though perhaps not “muddle-headed.”366 He strains to apply 
economic analysis to facts not persuasively susceptible to them, which 
leads to overlooking important factors while overweighting others. These 
contrasts make it unsurprising that tools available to a judicial fox like 
Cardozo would yield a more capacious and persuasive basis of justification 
than the tools applied by a judicial hedgehog like Posner.367 
 
                                                                                                      
 364. See supra text accompanying notes 256–304 (discussing Moch, Edwards, and 
Ultramares). 
 365. See supra text accompanying notes 305–332 (discussing Glanzer and Greycas). 
 366. Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 367. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1379, 1380 (1995). 
